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Abstract 
Through qualitative legal research, this paper will answer the question: ‘How can 
constitutionalism be balanced with a human rights perspective, in EU accession to the 
ECHR?’ We hypothesize that this balance is possible. From the current academic debate, 
three theories applicable to this research are distilled: constitutionalism; a human rights 
perspective; and institutionalism. Through application of the first two theories, a concrete 
proposal for the way forward in EU accession to the Convention is constructed. The legal 
options for this proposal consist of Treaty revisions (including the adoption of a 
‘notwithstanding’ protocol), unilateral measures (reservations, declarations, and agreements), 
and renegotiation of the Draft Accession Agreement. Thirteen amendments are proposed: 
eleven to the Draft Accession Agreement; one to the Draft Explanatory Report; and one to the 
TEU. Furthermore, it is argued throughout this research that institutionalist tendencies matter, 
but cannot serve as sole explanations for the Court’s reasoning. As the key conclusion, we 
find that a way forward in accession, that considers both constitutional demands and a human 
rights perspective, exists. Appended to this paper, a comprehensive proposal for this way 
forward is introduced. 
Key terms 
Opinion 2/13 – CJEU – ECtHR – Constitutionalism – Human Rights – 
Institutionalism – Draft Accession Agreement – Charter – Convention  
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Introduction 
After France’s ECHR-ratification in 1974, the idea of EU accession to the ECHR first 
came to light. However, in 1996, the ECJ held that accession required Treaty amendment.1 In 
Lisbon, the Treaties were indeed amended to include Article 6(2) TEU: “[t]he Union shall 
accede to the [Convention].”2 Additionally, Protocol (No 8) set out different aspects of 
accession.3 After years of negotiation between inter alia EU Member States, the Commission 
and the Convention’s High Contracting Parties, a Draft Accession Agreement (DAA) on 
accession was concluded.4 The Commission requested the CJEU’s opinion on the DAA’s 
Treaty-compatibility, pursuant Article 218(11) TFEU. Subsequently, in December 2014, 
‘Opinion 2/13’ blocked accession on several legal issues.5  
 Member States are required to ratify the ECHR before acceding to the EU,6 meaning 
that cases of fundamental rights infringements by Member States can be brought before 
Strasbourg. However, the EU and its institutions are not subject to ECtHR scrutiny, and 
cannot be addressed as a respondent here. The design of EU law further complicates this. For 
example, when a Member State while implementing an EU directive infringes (individual) 
fundamental rights, is the infringement a product of the directive, or of the way the Member 
State implements it? This type of legal uncertainty could be remedied by accession. Alas, 
Luxembourg decided that on the DAA’s terms, accession would be impossible.7  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Opinion 2/94, ECR, EU:C:1996:140, 28/3/1996. 
 
2 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01, Article 6(2) Treaty on European Union (hereafter: 
TEU). 
 
3 TEU, Protocol (No 8) Relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the Accession of the Union 
to the [ECHR]. 
 
4 Council of Europe, Final report to the CDDH, Strasbourg, June 10th, 2013, 47+1(2013)008rev2 (hereafter: 
DAA). 
5 Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, 18/12/2014, (hereafter: Opinion 2/13). 
 
6 ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ SN-180/1/93-REV1. 
 
7 Opinion 2/13. 
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This decision staggered human rights lawyers8 and faced heavy initial critique.9 
Numerous theoretical approaches are applicable to Opinion 2/13, as it is central to 
contemporary human rights protection. For IR scholars, the Opinion represents an almost 
glaring case of institutionalism.10 Luxembourg seemingly rejects the possibility of another 
Court removing it from its ‘European Supercourt’ position. And although there are prima 
facie indicators, it is not evident that institutional considerations are the sole explanatory 
factor behind the Opinion. Indeed, realist theoretical approaches seem to focus on 
constitutionalism, pluralism, federalism, and human rights when analyzing the Opinion.11 But 
there seems to be a theoretical gap concerning the idealist interpretation of the text. In 
analyzing how Opinion 2/13 affects not only human rights, but also EU law autonomy, we 
must not only focus on how it is, but also how it should be. From this perspective, two main 
concepts can be balanced: a human rights perspective and constitutionalism.12 
The Commission announced its intention to continue working on accession in its 
201613 and 201714 work programs, and in its May 2017 staff working document, accession 
was deemed a “priority”.15 However, it only reported it was “making good progress”.16 The 
initial outrage and criticism has somewhat simmered down. But accession has not come to a 
full stop, and it is important to keep providing the necessary input. Therefore this research 
focuses on how accession should look, considering the constitutional objections raised by the 
CJEU on the one hand, and the level of human rights protection in Europe on the other.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See, inter alia, Douglas-Scott, S. ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR: a Christmas bombshell from the 
European Court of Justice’. U.K. Const. L. Blog (24th December 2014)(available at 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org). 
 
9 Elaborated upon in ‘Literature Review’. 
 
10 Barnard, C. ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR: looking for the silver lining’ EU Law Analysis, (16th 
February 2015) (available at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl/2015/02/opinion-213-on-eu-accession-to-
echr.html). 
 
11 Halberstam, D. ‘”It’s the Autonomy Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the 
ECHR, and the Way Forward.’ Michigan Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 432 
(2015). 
 
12 Supra n. 9. 
 
13 European Commission, COM(2015) 610 final, Strasbourg, 27.10.2015. 
 
14 European Commission, COM(2016) 710 final, Strasbourg, 25.10.2016 . 
 
15 European Commission, COM(2017) 239 final, Brussels, 18.5.2017 SWD(2017) 162 final. 
 
16 Ibid. 
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Is it possible, post-Opinion 2/13, to accede without compromising fundamental rights 
protection? Some believe that accession upon Luxembourg’s terms would “only appeal to 
those who don’t like human rights very much.”17 These comments might appeal, but should 
not imply that no way forward is possible without “significantly diminishing”18 fundamental 
rights protection. Our objective must therefore be to find such a way. 
Specifically, our objective is to construct a proposal balanced between the two above-
mentioned approaches, with concrete recommendations for accession. To achieve this balance, 
we define the human rights perspective as being in favor of maintaining an adequate level of 
human rights protection in Europe upon accession. Constitutionalism, in our research, is 
understood as maintaining, or not detrimentally impairing, EU law autonomy.19 Concretely, 
we address the following research question:  
How can constitutionalism be balanced with a human rights perspective, in EU 
accession to the ECHR?  
We hypothesize that there is indeed a way forward that respects constitutional demands on the 
one hand, and a human rights perspective on the other. Through analyzing the Opinion with 
this hypothesis in mind, we aim to construct a proposal for accession, which, if successful, 
would confirm our hypothesis.  
 The following sections provide a review of the literature on Opinion 2/13 including a 
theoretical framework (Literature Review), the approach and methodology (Methodology), 
and the legal framework (Legal Framework). In the main section (Analyses) we critically 
analyze the seven main objections in Opinion 2/13 using our theoretical framework, and 
propose specific amendments (diverging slightly from the order presented by the Court, for 
reasons of readability). In the conclusion we critically discuss present research, and make 
recommendations. In Appendix I, we present a concrete, comprehensive proposal.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Peers, supra n. 8. 
 
18 Ibid. 
 
19 Supra n. 9. 
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Literature Review 
As of 2017, much has been written on the subject of the Opinion, from which we can 
distill three main theories applicable to this research: constitutionalism, a human rights 
perspective, and institutionalism. Most contributions appeared throughout 2015 and 2016. 
The constitutional perspective mostly offers a defense of Luxembourg’s objections. 
Prominently voiced by Halberstam, it firmly advocates a constitutional approach, for the EU’s 
legal order is “geared to vindicating all three constitutional values (including rights).”20 An 
institutionalist or human rights perspective alone somewhat disregards the context of EU law 
autonomy. In possibly the most favorable view of the Opinion, Halberstam argues, for 
example, that granting Strasbourg jurisdiction over CFSP could undermine the constitutional 
CJEU, which has limited jurisdiction in this area.21 Therefore, he argues, the EU should not be 
treated as a sovereign state. Furthermore, every Contracting Party has a court of first instance, 
and the EU should be entitled to a consolidating court of their own. In the same constitutional 
line of argument, Protocol No. 16 ECHR represents an attack upon EU law autonomy – 
advisory opinions from Strasbourg could involve interpretations of EU law.22 
Constitutionalists would argue that mutual trust should be preserved, as it is instrumental to 
EU law autonomy.23 Critics of this constitutional pluralism dub this radical pluralism: 
Eeckhout argues for enhanced judicial dialogue, because the legal space in which national 
courts, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg operate is the same; the different sets of laws governing 
this area cannot be seen as completely autonomous.24 He argues for a softer approach to 
pluralism, and rather focuses on the legal aspects of the Opinion.25 Furthermore, Callewaert 
argues,26 Article 52(3) EUChFR already limits EU law autonomy in fundamental rights, as “in 
so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to [the Convention], the meaning and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Halberstam, supra n. 11, p. 4. 
 
21 Ibid., p. 34. 
 
22 Ibid., p. 17. 
 
23 Ibid., p. 23. 
 
24 Eeckhout, P. ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or Autarky?’ 
Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/15 (www.jeanmonnetworkingprogram.org). 
 
25 Ibid. 
 
26 Callewaert, J. ‘Protocol 16 and the Autonomy of EU Law: Who is Threatening Whom?’ European Law 
Academy of Trier (2014). 
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scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention.”27 However, 
as the CJEU’s arguments largely concern EU constitutional autonomy, we argue throughout 
this research that any proposal that does not acknowledge this autonomy, will not be a 
feasible solution to the CJEU. 
Secondly, we apply a human rights perspective. This perspective is grounded in the 
level of individual protection guaranteed by international agreements, such as the Charter and 
the Convention. It often views the Opinion unfavorably. For example, according to Storgaard, 
Luxembourg “chose conflict”.28 Mohay euphemizes when calling the Opinion’s “contribution 
to an enhanced protection of fundamental rights in the EU […] questionable.”29 De Witte calls 
the concerns “radical” and “unjustified”.30 Some critics applying a human rights perspective 
even argue that accession on Luxembourg’s terms must be rejected.31 Peers, for example, sees 
it as a “danger to human rights protection”,32 and Douglas-Scott refers to the Opinion as a 
“bombshell”.33 Eeckhout warns of the reductionist effect of mutual trust preservation as 
ratione materiae: it would render future M.S.S.-type cases impossible.34 However, a 
constitutional approach can overlap with a human rights perspective: the Opinion might 
empower the CJEU to assert itself as a stronger human rights court, which might lead to 
higher standards in the EU.35 It could even be argued Opinion 2/13 is a tool for the CJEU to 
postpone accession, in order to build EUChFR case law, and ultimately “prove the Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26/10/2012, 2012/C 326/02, Article 
52(3), (hereafter: EUChFR). 
 
28 Storgaard, L.H. ‘EU Law Autonomy versus European Fundamental Rights Protection – On Opinion 2/13 on 
EU Accession to the ECHR’ Human Rights Law Review 15 (2015) p. 485-521. 
 
29 Mohay, Á . ‘Back to the Drawing Board? Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice on the Accession of the EU to 
the ECHR – Case note’ Pécs Journal of International and European Law (2015) p. 28-36. 
 
30 De Witte, B. ‘Opinion 2/13 on accession to the ECHR: defending the EU legal order against a foreign human 
rights court’ European Law Review (2015) p. 683-705. 
 
31 Not to imply a lack of human rights perspective in Halberstam’s work, who himself calls his analysis 
“charitable” towards Luxembourg. However: “we must [..] move away from an exclusively human rights 
focused interpretive approach and towards constitutional analysis”. 
 
32 Peers, supra n. 8. 
 
33 Douglas-Scott, S. ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR: a Christmas bombshell from the European 
Court of Justice’. U.K. Const. L. Blog (24th December 2014)(available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org). 
 
34 Eeckhout, supra n. 24. 
 
35 Barnard, supra n. 10. 
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takes human rights seriously.”36 Lock poses the question: “is it still desirable for the EU to 
accede to the ECHR in light of the Opinion?”37 Ultimately, under the Court’s demands, 
accession might surpass the idea of improving human rights protection in Europe. It is evident 
that critics applying a human rights perspective advocate maintaining an adequate level of 
protection. In our research we will apply this interpretation to any proposal we make. We will 
see that often this aim brings significant considerations to the table. However, certain 
measures might not impact the level of protection we wish to uphold. 
Although Halberstam firmly rejects the assertion,38 the Opinion cannot be viewed 
without regarding the classic IR theory of institutionalism.39 In short, “institutions […] 
structure action”.40 This institutionalist view is often applied alongside accusations of the 
Opinion being an “unfortunate case of judicial activism.”41 Luxembourg would be “legislating 
from the bench”, or guilty of “result-oriented judging.”42 According to Barnard, the Opinion 
can be seen as a political decision “dressed up in lawyers’ clothing.”43 From this perspective, 
it is easy to see why the institutionalist character of the Opinion has not gone unnoticed: it can 
be seen as a strengthening of the CJEU’s position.44 In fact, David Thór Björgvinsson, a 
former ECtHR Judge, stated: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Łazowski, A., Wessel, R.A. ‘When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the European 
Union to the ECHR’ 16th German Law Journal (2015) p. 179-212. 
 
37 Lock, T. ‘The future of the European Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights after 
Opinion 2/13: is it still possible and is it still desirable?’ European Constitutional Law Review (2015)11 p. 239-
273. 
 
38 Halberstam, supra n. 11. 
 
39 Aspinwall, M., Schneider, G. ‘The Rules of Integration: Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe’ 
Manchester University Press (2001). 
 
40 Clemens, E.S., Cook, J.M. ‘Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change.’ Annual Review 
of Sociology 25 (1999), p. 441–466. 
 
41 De Witte, supra n. 30. 
 
42 Kmiec, K.D. ‘The Origin and Current Meanings of Judicial Activism’ California Law Review Volume 92(5), 
Article 4 (2004), p. 1441-1478. 
 
43 Barnard, supra n. 10. 
 
44 Ibid. 
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“… I think you have to look at it from the historical perspective – institutions adapt to 
the political environment in which they are operating […] it is about the survival of an 
institution.”45 
So, through this judicial activism, Luxembourg supposedly seeks to maintain its 
position as ‘European Supercourt’. Not only externally, i.e., towards Strasbourg, but also EU-
internally. For example, in the Opinion EU law principles such as the preliminary rulings 
procedure are extended.46 Arguably, by postponing accession, the CJEU offers itself the 
chance to build upon the Charter and EU case law.47 This would supposedly allow 
Luxembourg to further expand the EU’s sui generis legal system. Morijn even deems this 
Luxembourg’s “unstated primary aim”.48 Isiksel goes even further, by describing the Opinion 
as exemplary “European Exceptionalism”:49 Luxembourg finds itself the most capable 
fundamental rights adjudicator, and therefore exceptional. Throughout present research the 
reader will notice that institutionalist considerations appear to have played a role in CJEU’s 
judgment. It is important, however, not to ascribe the Opinion in its entirety to this line of 
reasoning, as it is shown that considerations which seem institutionalist can still be 
constitutionally significant. We argue that institutionalist tendencies matter, but cannot serve 
as sole explanations for Luxembourg’s objections. For the specific aim of constructing our 
balanced proposal therefore, we will mostly apply a human rights perspective, and 
constitutional approach. 
Finally, some contributors offered proposals for accession. Legally, this mainly 
involves the following options; Treaty revisions, unilateral measures, and DAA renegotiation. 
Lock argues for the latter, as Treaty revisions seem highly unlikely, while unilateral measures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 David Thór Björgvinsson, in Butler, G. ‘A Political Decision Disguised as Legal Argument? Opinion 2/13 and 
European Union Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’. Utrecht Journal of International and 
European Law (2015) 31(81), 104-111. 
 
46 Daminova, N. ‘Protocol No. 16 of the ECHR in CJEU Opinion 2/13: Analysis and perspectives’, DIRPOLIS 
Institute, Pisa (2016) p. 2. 
 
47 Łazowski, Wessel, supra n. 36. 
 
48 Morijn, J. ‘After Opinion 2/13: how to move on in Strasbourg and Brussels’, Eutopia Law Blog, Matrix 
Chambers’ EU Law Group, (Jan 2015) (available at: https://eutopialaw.com/2015/01/05/after-opinion-213-how-
to-move-on-in-strasbourg-and-brussels/).  
 
49 Isikel, T. ‘European Exceptionalism and the EU’s Accession to the ECHR’ The European Journal of 
International Law Vol. 27 no. 3 (2016) p. 565-589. 
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might not be enough to satisfy either Court.50 Halberstam conversely argues unilateral 
measures such as binding declarations would be far more likely considering the political 
environment, and could serve to defend EU constitutional principles.51 Besselink proposes a 
‘notwithstanding’ protocol: “The Union shall accede to the [ECHR], notwithstanding Article 
6(2) [TEU], Protocol (No 8) […] and Opinion 2/13[…].”52 These legal tools prove essential to 
our research, and for constructing a proposal. They are discussed extensively in our ‘Legal 
Framework’ section. 
 Through a brief literature review, we see numerous theoretical approaches applicable 
to the Opinion. Throughout our analyses we return to these prominent voices, as they prove 
crucial to understanding the Opinion’s complexities. However, what appears to be missing 
from the academic debate to date, and the subject of present research, is a constructive 
approach to the Opinion: How can constitutionalism be balanced with a human rights 
perspective, in EU accession to the ECHR?  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Lock, supra n. 37. 
 
51 Halberstam, supra n. 11. 
 
52 Besselink, L.F.M. ‘Acceding to the ECHR notwithstanding the Court of Justice Opinion 2/13’ 
Verfassungsblog (Dec 2014) (http://verfassungsblog.de/acceding-echr-notwithstanding-court-justice-opinion-
213-2/). 
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Methodology 
Legal analysis will form the larger part of our approach, as the Opinion contains 
mostly legal objections to accession. The seven53 main objections of the Court – mutual trust, 
Articles 53, Protocol 16, Article 344, the co-respondent mechanism, the prior involvement 
procedure, and CSFP jurisdiction – will be analyzed in terms of compatibility with EU 
accession to the ECHR. For example, Article 6(2) TEU can be interpreted either as an 
absolute obligation to accede, or as a conditional obligation with regard to Protocol (No 8).54 
Close scrutiny of the Article, the Protocol, and the CJEU’s arguments, can clarify this. In our 
attempt to consolidate our two main theoretical approaches, we look for opportunity in the 
legal space suitable to both.  
Through this legal research we attempt to establish a sound proposal on how accession 
should look from a human rights perspective, whilst respecting constitutional autonomy. This 
proposal’s success will be measurable by critically examining the balance of these two 
perspectives. Throughout this research the legal framework presented in the following section 
is consistently recognized. To achieve a balanced view of our theories, a form of theoretical 
comparative analysis comes in to play. Discourse analysis can be applicable in both the 
Opinion and the relevant case law. For example, the language used by Advocate-General 
Kokott differs vastly from that in Opinion 2/13. Where the AG’s arguments in reaction to the 
prior involvement mechanism are basically stated as ‘Yes, but…’, the Court reasons along the 
lines of ‘No, unless...’.55 Furthermore, content- and discourse analysis applied to the Opinion, 
and the academic debate, gives us thorough insight into the diverging approaches applied by 
the CJEU, the Advocate-General, and scholars – which will allow us to fully understand the 
complications at hand. Through these analyses we can establish a sound understanding of 
different theoretical approaches, such as constitutionalism,56 classic IR institutionalism,57 and 
a human rights perspective. Integrating these facets of different analyses into the general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Depending on how the arguments are sub-categorized. We will use a categorization similar to that of Douglas-
Scott, supra n. 33. 
 
54 Barnard, supra n. 10. 
 
55 Halberstam, supra n. 11. 
 
56 Halberstam’s plural constitutionalism seems best fit for the purposes this research. See: Halberstam, D. ‘Local, 
Global, and Plural Constitutionalism: Europe Meets the World’ Michigan Law, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series No. 176 (2009). 
 
57 Aspinwall, Schneider, supra n. 39, p. 75. 
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approach of classic qualitative legal research provides us with in-depth considerations for the 
construction of a proposal that reconciles constitutionalism with a human rights perspective. 
In the following section, we will discuss our legal framework and instruments. 
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Legal Framework 
Before analyzing the Court’s arguments, it is important to define the legal framework 
on which the Opinion and DAA are based, and to which our proposal must be suited. ECJ 
Opinion 2/94 established the necessity of Treaty amendment for accession,58 and heralded the 
adoption of Article 6(2) in the Lisbon Treaty, which reads: “The Union Shall accede to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”59 The 
Article provides a caveat: “accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in 
the Treaties.”60 Thus, legal obligation for the EU’s accession is established. Note however, 
that this obligation is at best lex imperfecta,61 as it is obviously also for the non-EU 
Contracting Parties to the Convention to decide whether accession takes place.62 Article 59(2) 
ECHR serves as the Convention-counterpart to Article 6(2) TEU, as it opens up accession for 
the EU by means of Protocol No. 14, stating that “the European Union may accede to [the] 
Convention”, after previously only being open to states.63 The ECHR binds all 47 Contracting 
Parties of the Council of Europe, whereas EU law, including the EUChFR, naturally only 
binds the 28 (still) EU Member States. 
 Article 6(2) TEU must be read together with Protocol (No 8), which specifies the 
DAA “shall make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union 
law”, “shall ensure that accession […] shall not affect the competences of the Union or the 
powers of its institutions”, and that “nothing in the agreement […] shall affect Article 344 
[TFEU]”.64 Declaration (No 2) on Article 6(2) doubles the call for preservation of the 
“specific features of Union law”.65 Significantly, Article 344 TFEU, referred to in Protocol 
(No 8), compels Member States “not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Opinion 2/94, supra n. 1. 
 
59 TEU, Article 6(2). 
 
60 Ibid. 
 
61 Benoit-Rohmer, F. ‘L’adhésion de l’Union à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme’ 19 Journal de 
droit européen, (2011) p. 285 (in Łazowski, Wessel, supra n. 36) 
 
62 Lazowski and Wessel therefore argue that the only obligation is to seek accession. (see: supra n. 36). 
 
63 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, Article 59(2), (hereafter: ECHR). 
 
64 TEU, Protocol (No 8). 
 
65 TEU, Declaration (No 2) on Article 6(2). 
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application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for 
therein.”66,67 Taken together with relevant Luxembourg and Strasbourg case law,68 the above-
mentioned articles provided the framework for Luxembourg to assess the DAA’s Treaty-
compatibility.69 Our proposal must fit this framework. 
Legal Instruments 
Our proposal’s legal options include Treaty revisions (including the ‘notwithstanding’ 
protocol), unilateral measures (reservations, declarations, and agreements), and DAA revision. 
We consider Treaty amendment a drastic measure. Nevertheless, the TFEU allows for it: 
“Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force 
unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised.”70 We consider two types of Treaty 
amendment. First, we (briefly) consider adopting Besselink’s ‘notwithstanding’ protocol.71 
However, our research question requires consideration of Luxembourg’s constitutional 
demands. Apart from being nothing short of a nuclear option, such a protocol would not 
address the Court’s concerns – and is therefore unfit for our research. Secondly, we could 
propose ‘tailor-made’ Treaty revisions. We could, for instance, consider Articles upon which 
the mutual trust reasoning is based, and amend these to suit accession. Considering Treaty 
revision inherently involves considering the ramifications of the Article 48 TEU ordinary 
revision procedure, and it is widely accepted that unanimity among Member States is 
improbable.72,73 Therefore, we must not consider it lightly. 
We could propose unilateral reservations to the Convention.74 The DAA stipulates 
how these would work: the law reserved upon must be in force at the moment of accession 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 
2007, 2008/C 115/01, Article 344, (hereafter: TFEU). 
 
67 On first glance, the reader notes how subjecting the EU to ECtHR review might collide with this Article. 
 
68 Addressed in appropriate sections. 
 
69 Assessment requested pursuant Article 218(11) TFEU. 
 
70 TFEU, Article 218(11). 
 
71 Besselink, supra n. 52. 
 
72 e.g.: Lock, supra n. 37, p. 245. 
 
73 Treaty revision can also be applied to the Convention – which is at least equally drastic. 
 
74 ECHR, Article 57. 
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(no future reservations are permitted), and reservations of a too “general character” are 
inacceptable.75 Strasbourg reviews Article 57 compliance, and interprets reservations.76 This 
complicates proposing reservations in our research. Furthermore, reservations are often 
revealed to have detrimental effects for human rights protection. 
Interpretive declarations77 could be adopted to clarify some of the issues found by 
Luxembourg. These declarations by Member States would only bind Strasbourg if all other 
parties to the DAA accept these interpretations.78 But they might appease Luxembourg in 
some of the inter-EU problems the Opinion describes. Disconnection clauses or agreements 
between Member States could establish the same EU-internal effect, by reaffirming 
agreements between Member States take favor over Convention law.79 But they also do not 
automatically bind Strasbourg to recognition. We will see that ‘disconnecting’ from 
Convention law could, just as reservations, have a reductionist effect on fundamental rights 
protection. 
Lastly, we have the option of DAA renegotiation. It would entail all parties to the 
agreement to accept a new outcome. This would, just as Treaty revision, be a cumbersome 
process. However, as we will show, it is often the most effective remedy to the CJEU’s 
constitutional objections. It is also where the potential of present research lies: it allows us to 
propose revisions that take constitutional demands and a human rights perspective into 
account. However, for the quality of our proposal it is important to consider all available legal 
tools, as DAA amendment might not solve all the Opinion’s issues. In the following sections, 
we will analyze Luxembourg’s seven main objections. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ibid. 
 
76 Lock, supra n. 37, p. 245. 
 
77 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates this possibility.  
 
78 Cameron, I. ‘Treaties, Declarations of Interpretation’ (2007), in Lock, supra n. 37. 
 
79 Smrkolj, M. ‘The Use of the “Disconnection Clause” in International Treaties: What does it tell us about the 
EC/EU as an Actor in the Sphere of Public International Law?’ GARNET Conference, Brussels, (2008). 
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Analyses 
Protocol No. 16 
Protocol No. 16 ECHR, which allows the “[h]ighest courts and tribunals of a High 
Contracting Party [to] request the [ECtHR] to give advisory opinions on questions of principle 
relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the 
Convention”,80 was introduced to create a more cooperative relationship between the ECtHR 
and domestic courts, to improve efficiency (by caseload reduction), and to enhance legitimacy 
in subsidiarity-principles.81,82 It would allow Strasbourg to provide guiding interpretations to 
domestic courts in the application of Convention rights. And although the Protocol appears to 
be inspired by the EU preliminary reference procedure,83,84 there are significant differences, 
such as the non-binding and voluntary nature of the ECtHR-references. 
The CJEU argued the DAA offered insufficient protection for EU law autonomy and 
the preliminary rulings procedure against Protocol 16.85 This provides a core constitutional 
argument to consider for this research. Notably, Protocol 16 had only been signed by nine 
Member States in December 201486 – and ratified by none.87 By September 2017, three out of 
seven Contracting Parties that have ratified the Protocol are Member States88 – which means 
it has not yet entered into force.89 This would prompt human rights critics to assess the 
Court’s objections as extremely protective. From an institutionalist perspective it could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 ECHR, Protocol No. 16, Article 1(1). 
 
81 Specifically, domestic courts apply Convention rights under the subsidiarity principle. 
 
82 Voland, T., Schiebel, B. ‘Advisory Opinions of the European Court of Human Rights: Unbalancing the 
System of Human Rights Protection in Europe?’ Human Rights Law Review 17(2017) p. 73-95. 
 
83 TFEU, Article 267. 
 
84 Gragl, P. ‘(Judicial) Love is Not a One-way Street: The EU Preliminary Reference Procedure as a Model for 
ECtHR Advisory Opinions under Draft Protocol No 16’ 38 European Law Review (2013). 
 
85 Opinion 2/13, par. 197. 
 
86 Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (infra n. 88). 
 
87 Lock, supra n. 37., Voland, Schiebel, supra n. 82. 
 
88 Finland, Lithuania, and Slovenia (source: http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/214/signatures?p_auth=bcyYglbk). 
 
89 This happens upon ratification by ten Contracting Parties (Protocol No. 16, Article 8[1]). 
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argued that Luxembourg is fending off any possibility of Strasbourg impinging on its 
jurisdiction. Either way, the DAA predates the Protocol, presumably reason for negotiators to 
omit it. The CJEU found this insufficient on constitutional grounds.  
Obviously, Luxembourg fears the possibility that Member States could seek 
alternative resolve in cases of EU law interpretation in fundamental rights, a situation Article 
344 TFEU prohibits. Particularly when a “request for an advisory opinion [..] could trigger the 
procedure for the prior involvement of the Court of Justice”90 would circumvent the EU 
preliminary rulings procedure. However, Article 3 DAA explains the proposed procedure 
should only be triggered where the EU is a co-respondent. But in Protocol No. 16’s advisory 
opinions, there are no respondents.91 Luxembourg did not explain how the prior involvement 
procedure could be triggered here.92 Furthermore, the optional advisory opinion would be 
non-binding, and Member States remain under the obligation of referral to Luxembourg under 
Article 267 TFEU. However, the Court seems to take a protective constitutional approach 
towards Protocol 16. The Court’s reasoning builds on the role of preliminary reference held in 
Melki and Abdeli,93 and A v B,94,95 and now regards the procedure as “keystone of the judicial 
system.”96 We must therefore not take Luxembourg’s constitutional arguments lightly in our 
analysis. 
An effective and legitimate ECtHR is undoubtedly in the interest of sound 
fundamental rights protection. Otherwise, accession would not be considered to begin with. 
And although the Protocol’s functioning has faced criticism, it would still reduce Strasbourg’s 
long-term workload, and enhance legitimacy.97 Especially when regarding future ECtHR 
developments (based on Protocol 14 and 1598), it could be considered detrimental would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Opinion 2/13, par. 198. 
 
91 Lock, supra n. 37. 
 
92 Elaborated upon in ‘Co-respondent Mechanism’. 
 
93 C-188/10 Melki and Abdeli ECLI:EU:C:2010:363. 
 
94 C-184/14-A A v B ECLI:EU:C:2015:479. 
 
95 Daminova, supra n. 46, p. 2. 
 
96 Opinion 2/13, par. 198. 
 
97 Voland, Schiebel, supra n. 82. 
 
98 Ibid. 
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Luxembourg’s request for a “provision in respect of the relationship between […] Protocol 16 
and the preliminary ruling procedure”99 limit domestic court’s access Strasbourg’s advisory 
opinions. It is therefore essential to our proposal that Member States can access Protocol 16, 
without impairing EU law autonomy. 
Advocate-General Kokott offers perspective: the ‘Protocol 16 problem’ does not 
originate from accession, as domestic courts may request opinions from Strasbourg regardless 
of it (i.e. accession).100 Furthermore, Member States remain bound by Article 267 in cases 
involving fundamental EU law matters, which takes precedence over international agreements 
ratified by Member States.101 Lastly, the CJEU’s supposed conflict with the preliminary 
rulings mechanism is hardly of substance: the DAA nor the Protocol provide the EU a co-
respondent status.  
The main issue is that Member States should refer to Luxembourg once a question 
involves the interpretation of EU law. It appears the legal structure to resolve this is already 
present, and that accession without compromising human rights protection is possible. And, 
the ECtHR itself also recognizes that failure to adhere to Article 267 TFEU is an ECHR 
violation for Member States.102 Adopting binding declarations not to ratify Protocol 16103 
could compromise ECtHR effectiveness and legitimacy – and would also come too late.104 
Treaty revision could adversely affect EU law autonomy, as the preliminary reference 
procedure is considered “keystone.”105 Our proposal must consist of a DAA amendment, to 
provide a restatement or clarification of Member States’ 267 obligations, as this would respect 
EU constitutional autonomy, without compromising fundamental rights protection by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Opinion 2/13, par. 199. 
 
100 View of Advocate-General Kokott in Opinion 2/13. 
 
101 Voland, Schiebel, supra n. 82. 
 
102 Ibid. 
 
103 Suggested by Lock, supra n. 37. 
 
104 Supra n. 88. 
 
105 Opinion 2/13, par. 198. 
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eliminating access to Protocol 16.106 The following amendment would fit our research 
question, and confirm our hypothesis:107 
Article 5 DAA – Protocol No. 16 
“In the event of a request for an advisory opinion from the Court, in the meaning 
established in Protocol No. 16 of the Convention, EU Member States shall recognize their 
obligation for preliminary reference to the Court of Justice under Article 267 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in all questions relating to the 
interpretation, application, and validity of European Union law.”108 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 We prefer not to apply a drastic measure, as Protocol 16 is not in effect. However, we cannot disregard the 
future potential of Protocol 16. 
 
107 See: p. 7. 
 
108 In our in-text amendments, italicized text is new. Non-italicized text is from the original DAA. In DAA 
amendments, ‘the Court’ refers to the ECtHR. 
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Articles 53 
In Melloni, the CJEU (controversially109) ruled: “the application of national standards 
of protection of fundamental rights must not compromise the level of protection provided for 
by the Charter or the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law.”110 And in Opinion 2/13, it 
held: “Article 53 of the ECHR essentially reserves the power of the Contracting Parties to lay 
down higher standards of protection of fundamental rights than those guaranteed by the 
ECHR”, and that “[this] provision should be coordinated with Article 53 of the Charter.”111 
However, there is “no provision […] to ensure such coordination.”112 The CJEU apparently 
fears that, in a Melloni-situation before the Court, Member States could claim liberty to 
provide “higher”113 levels of protection than the Charter, derived from the Convention. 
 Obviously, Luxembourg’s intention in Melloni and the Opinion is not to constrain 
Member States to lower standards of protection. From a constitutional perspective, the 
decisions are a means to remove potential loopholes for Member States to question EU law 
primacy.114 As Eeckhout admits, theoretically, there is a conflict between Articles 53 of the 
Charter and the Convention, as the Convention potentially allows a certain level of protection 
which the Charter disallows.115 It is however unthinkable Strasbourg would force Member 
States to apply a level of protection higher than the Convention standard. The Convention 
simply allows. And as Member States remain subject to EU law primacy, which disallows this 
potentially higher standard – there seems to be no problem to begin with. Contracting Parties, 
including Member States, are not granted any powers they did not have before ECHR-
accession.116 So from a legal, constitutional perspective, accession would not affect EU law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 See: Łazowski, Wessel, supra n. 36. 
 
110 C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, restated in Opinion 2/13, par. 188. 
 
111 Opinion 2/13, par. 189. 
 
112 Opinion 2/13, par. 190. 
 
113 Luxembourg’s phrasing in Opinion 2/13 – which Halberstam dubs ‘strange’, supra n. 11. 
 
114 Korenica, F., Doli, D. ‘“Not Taking Rights Seriously” Opting for the Primacy of EU Law over Broader 
Human Rights Protection: Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Opinion 2/13’s ‘Unserious’ Stance on 
Article 53 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ Relationship to Article 53 ECHR’ International Human Rights 
Law Review, Volume 4, Issue 2 (2015) p. 277-302. 
 
115 Eeckhout, supra n. 24. 
 
116 Halberstam, supra n. 11. 
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autonomy, or the Melloni-principles.117 In our balancing exercise, we must merely satisfy the 
Court’s demand for coordination. 
 From a human rights perspective, one can criticize the Melloni-decisions, effectively 
ruling EU law effectiveness to prevail over Member States’ abilities to provide higher 
standards of protection than the Treaties.118 However, when taking the Melloni-principles as 
they are, the CJEU’s objection seems inconsequential. The current situation limits the level of 
protection applicable by Member States under EU law primacy. Post-accession, there would 
be no discernable difference in level of protection. Article 53 ECHR would not affect the 
Melloni-principles. Article 53 EUChFR explicitly binds its interpretation to the minimum 
Convention-standard.119 This allows us to safely argue that assuming our proposal does not 
fundamentally alter Article 53 EUChFR, or the Melloni-principles – all other resolves would 
be acceptable from a human rights perspective.120 
Our only hurdle is the demand for a “provision […] to ensure […] coordination”. As 
Lock argued, unilateral interpretive declarations might not suffice to appease Luxembourg: 
there are no guarantees that the ECtHR respects these declarations.121 Reservations on Article 
53 ECHR seem unlikely, as they would affect one of the pillars on which the Convention is 
based,122 be too general and broad in scope for Strasbourg to accept,123 and therefore be no 
decent proposal. Treaty amendment would for the purpose of Articles 53-coordination be 
drastic – and, as established, could shift fundamental rights standards. Therefore, we propose 
a clarifying provision in the DAA, coordinating the Articles. This could easily be done,124 by 
affirming that Member States upon accession still adhere to EU law primacy (which is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Note: Advocate-General Kokott did not consider this at all. 
 
118 Korenica, Doli, supra n. 114. 
 
119 EUChFR, Article 53: “Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law 
and […] the [ECHR], and by the Member States’ constitutions.” 
 
120 (Safely) assuming that the Melloni-principles remain unaltered, to preserve “specific characteristics of […] 
Union law” (Protocol [No 8]). 
 
121 Lock, supra n. 37. 
 
122 Łazowski, Wessel, supra n. 36. 
 
123 Korenica, Doli, supra n. 114. 
 
124 Melloni already established the primacy-idea Luxembourg wants to see confirmed. 
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uncontested by the Convention). This would effectively balance fundamental rights protection 
with the Court’s constitutional demand, and thus confirm our hypothesis. 
Article 7 DAA – Interpretation of Articles 53 of the Charter and the Convention 
“EU Member States, when interpreting Article 53 of the Convention, shall respect the 
primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law. In particular, they shall not interpret Article 
53 of the Convention as an obligation to provide higher domestic standards of 
fundamental rights protection than guaranteed by the Convention.”  
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Article 344 TFEU 
Article 344 TFEU binds Member States “not to submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those 
provided for therein.”125 The Convention similarly excludes Contracting Parties’ submission 
“to a means of settlement other than those provided for in [the] Convention.”126 But upon 
accession, Convention and Union law would partially overlap.127 The DAA negotiators 
attempted to resolve this potential conflict in Article 5 DAA, establishing that “proceedings 
before the [CJEU] are [not] means of dispute settlement within the meaning of Article 55 of 
the ECHR.”128 This allows Member States to settle Convention-related disputes in 
Luxembourg. Unfortunately, the CJEU was not satisfied, as there was no provision forbidding 
the settlement of such disputes before the ECtHR, which is “liable […] to undermine the 
objective of Article 344 TFEU”.129 The Court dedicated a staggering 14 paragraphs to its 344-
objections.130 To many critics, this is exemplary of the CJEU’s lack of trust in the EU legal 
order.131 From an institutionalist perspective, Øby Johansen argues the strict reasoning of the 
CJEU on Article 344 “leaves us with the perception that the Court is reining in the member 
states—perhaps in an attempt to bolster its claim of being the one and only apex court of 
Europe.”132 Furthermore, numerous other mixed agreements involve external dispute 
settlement mechanisms that were never subjected to these strict safeguards.133 This was 
specifically noted by the Advocate-General,134 and subsequently ignored by the Court.135 
Moreover, the Advocate-General believed Article 344 would suffice to keep Member States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 TFEU, Article 344. 
 
126 ECHR, Article 55. 
 
127 International agreements signed by the EU fall between primary and secondary law. 
 
128 DAA, par. 57. 
 
129 Opinion 2/13, par. 212. 
 
130 Opinion 2/13, par. 201-214. 
 
131 See, inter alia: Mohay, supra n. 29, Lock, supra n. 37. 
 
132 Øby Johansen, S. ‘The Reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 and Its Potential Consequences’ 
German Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2015) p. 176. 
 
133 Inter alia the Aarhus Convention, and the UNCATOC (see: Ibid., p. 169-178). 
 
134 View of Advocate-General Kokott in Opinion 2/13, par. 177. 
 
135 Øby Johansen, supra n. 132. 
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from seeking external settlement. The CJEU appears to be worried Member States might 
violate EU law, and wants an outside remedy. Furthermore, violating Article 344 is obviously 
problematic regardless of accession. 
From a constitutional perspective, Halberstam notes that Article 33 ECHR (allowing 
Contracting Parties to bring alleged breaches of Convention provisions before the ECtHR) 
demands Strasbourg to entertain the above-mentioned type of suit.136 And although Advocate-
General Kokott claims any such suit could be declared inadmissible,137 it remains unclear 
whether the ECtHR would accept inadmissibility based on violation of external Treaties. 
Furthermore, if Strasbourg reviews admissibility, it might be reviewing matters of EU law. 
But Member States bringing such a case to Strasbourg would be in violation of the Treaties to 
begin with, the severity of which they have been reminded of in the MOX Plant case (the 
most prominent Article 344-case prior to the Opinion).138 However, Luxembourg takes a 
protective stance, which from a constitutional point of view is imaginable. It demanded 
exclusion: 
“.. only the express exclusion of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction under Article 33 of the 
ECHR over disputes between Member States or between Member States and the EU in 
relation to the application of the ECHR within the scope ratione materiae of EU law 
would be compatible with Article 344 TFEU.”139 
Hence, the theoretical possibility of Member States breaching EU law is unacceptable 
to the Court. This we must factor into our proposal. 
Gragl approaches the issue from a human rights perspective, opining that the EU will 
be unaffected in its ability to promote human rights in its external relations upon accession 
under the CJEU’s conditions.140 And regarding EU-related inter-party applications, Article 35 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Halberstam, supra n. 11. 
 
137 View of Advocate-General Kokott in Opinion 2/13. 
 
138 Case C-459/03 MOX Plant ECLI:EU:C:2006:345. The Commission commenced an action against Ireland 
under Article 226 EC for bringing proceedings against the UK under UNCLOS XV. The Commission (and Court) 
held that Ireland failed to respect the ECJ’s exclusive jurisdiction under Article 292 over any dispute concerning 
the interpretation and application of Community law.  
 
139 Opinion 2/13, par. 213. 
 
140 Gragl, P. ‘A reminiscence of Westphalia: inter-party cases after the EU’s accession to the ECHR and the 
EU’s potential as a human rights litigator’ Human Rights Law in Europe: The Influence, Overlaps and 
Contradictions of the EU and the ECHR’ Routledge Publishing (2014) p. 35-54. 
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ECHR allows Luxembourg to remedy alleged Convention-violations before Strasbourg may 
adjudicate.141 But it seems as if this jurisdictional issue has a minimal effect on the level of 
individual protection. As argued, disputes between Member States regarding violations in the 
implementation of EU law should already be brought before Luxembourg – accession would 
not change this. A solution proposed by Lock (a “pre-clearing mechanism similar to the prior 
involvement procedure”142) could be procedurally too complicated, which could impair the 
CJEU-ECtHR system in dealing with applications,143 so for our research this proposition is 
unfit. To find a solution that respects both the Court’s constitutional concerns, and upholds 
human rights standards, we turn to our legal tools.  
Advocate-General Kokott suggested a binding declaration in which Member States 
agree not to initiate or engage in proceedings under Article 33 ECHR, when the object of the 
dispute falls within the material scope of EU law.144 According to Halberstam, this would 
allow the Strasbourg to declare Article 344-cases inadmissible.145 He believes this could 
appease Luxembourg, “depending on how the [its] other concerns are addressed.”146 But 
depending on the Court’s favorable intentions in this case seems impractical. Treaty 
amendment seems drastic, although Øby Johansen advocates for this option: “a paragraph at 
the end of ECHR Article 33” clarifying “applications by an EU Member State, or the 
European Union, alleging a breach of the Convention by another EU Member State, or the 
European Union, are inadmissible”.147 He calls this legally trivial, and politically feasible, but 
there is no guarantee that non-EU Contracting Parties will agree to this.148 Therefore, to 
achieve a sound balance between the constitutional demand, without unduly delaying 
proceedings through a pre-clearing mechanism, we again propose DAA revision. Specifically, 
the following would confirm our hypothesis: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
141 ECHR, Article 35(1): “The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law[…].” 
 
142 Lock, supra n. 36, p. 256. 
 
143 Lock acknowledges these complications – but for the purposes of our research this is considered detrimental. 
 
144 View of Advocate-General Kokott in Opinion 2/13. 
 
145 Halberstam, supra n. 11. 
 
146 Ibid. 
 
147 Øby Johansen, supra n. 132. 
 
148 Imagine Russia and Turkey accepting a revision demanded to ensure EU autonomy. 
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Article 4(3) DAA 
“The Court of Justice, under Article 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, has sole jurisdiction in questions between the EU Member States, or between the 
EU Member States and the European Union, that fall within the scope ratione materiae of 
EU law.”  
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Mutual Trust 
Opinion 2/13 reaffirms the EU’s principle of mutual trust, according to which Member 
States cannot judge another Member States’ compliance with fundamental rights obligations 
when implementing EU law – save rare occasions. I.e., Member States work upon the 
assumption of compliance.149 The Convention however, requires Contracting Parties to check 
each other’s compliance. Therefore, Luxembourg found that: 
“In so far as the ECHR would […] require a Member State to check that another 
Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an 
obligation of mutual trust between those Member States, accession is liable to upset 
the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law.”150 
The Advocate-General neglected to address this problem.151 But arguing constitutionally, the 
CJEU essentially wants a mutual trust carve out upon accession.152 
To understand the scope of this issue, and its place in present research, it is necessary 
to review the provisions and case law that govern this principle, and how they were shaped by 
their respective institutions. First, the Dublin Regulation explicitly justifies mutual trust: all 
Member States, “respecting the principle of non-refoulement, are considered as safe countries 
for third country nationals”.153 However, Strasbourg found Belgium and Greece in violation 
of the Convention when applying mutual trust to asylum seekers, in the 2011 M.S.S. case.154 
Subsequently, in N.S., Luxembourg attempted to (partially) remedy this tension from its own 
constitutional perspective, by introducing systemic deficiencies:155  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 However, violations do occur. See: Alegre, S., Leaf, M. ‘Mutual Recognition in European Judicial 
Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study – the European Arrest Warrant’ European Law Journal 10 
(2004) p. 200-217. 
 
150 Opinion 2/13, par. 194. 
 
151 View of Advocate-General Kokott in Opinion 2/13. 
 
152 Eeckhout, supra n. 24. 
 
153 European Union, Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum 
lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities ("Dublin Convention"), 15 June 1990, 
Official Journal C 254, 19/08/1997, Preamble Recital (2). 
 
154 C-30696/09 M.S.S. vs Belgium and Greece ECtHR 21:1:11. 
 
155 C-411/10 N.S. ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. 
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“Member States […] may not transfer an asylum seeker to the ‘Member State 
responsible’ where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies […] in that 
Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker 
would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the 
meaning of Article 4 [EUChFR].”156  
Following N.S. (and Abdullahi157), Strasbourg issued its Tarakhel-judgement (one 
month prior to Opinion 2/13), effectively disagreeing with Luxembourg on the systemic 
deficiencies-approach as a ‘full solution’: the Convention should also be applied in its full 
extent to individual cases.158 Strasbourg proffered diplomatic assurances: Swiss authorities in 
this case had to “obtain assurances from their Italian counterparts,”159 ensuring conditions 
would be adapted to children and the family.160 So in the absence of systemic deficiencies, 
individual circumstances still require Contracting Parties to obtain assurances.161 The two 
Courts’ diverging approaches of individual examination, and general systemic deficiencies, 
form the basis of the mutual trust problem in Opinion 2/13 – and the starting point for our 
proposal’s reconciliation effort. 
 Now that we have established the depth of the mutual trust disconnect, we should 
critically analyze the CJEU’s constitutional claim that due to mutual trust, accession is liable 
to upset EU law autonomy and its underlying balance.162 From a constitutional point of view, 
Halberstam approaches the subject surprisingly: he claims accession would dissolve some of 
the constitutional tension in the EU’s vertical judicial system that exists today.163 Basically, 
the Solange doctrine applied by Member States’ High Courts, disallows review of individual 
applications claiming violations, assuming the EU provides an equivalent standard of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Ibid., par. 94 (Emphasis added). 
 
157 C-394/12 Abdullahi v. Bundesasylamt EU:C:2013:813. 
 
158 C-29217/12 Tarakhel vs Switzerland ECtHR 4:11:14. 
 
159 Ibid. 
 
160 However, it neglected to define what ‘sufficient’ assurances would consist of. 
 
161 Vicini, G. ‘The Dublin Regulation between Strasbourg and Luxembourg: Reshaping Non-Refoulement in the 
Name of Mutual Trust’, European Journal of Legal Studies, 8, (2015), p. 50-72. 
 
162 Opinion 2/13, par. 194. 
 
163 Halberstam, supra n. 11. 
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protection.164 Strasbourg’s well-known Bosphorus doctrine allows for rebuttal of the 
equivalence-assumption in cases where protection of Convention rights appears “manifestly 
deficient.”165 Halberstam theorizes that an individual denied application at, e.g., the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, against the application of mutual trust, can seek remedy in 
Strasbourg. This is constitutionally problematic, as the ECtHR would then have to review 
matters of EU law. But after accession, the EU can step in166 and take responsibility for the 
violation, while preserving the mutual trust principle.167 This observation is significant, as 
Halberstam’s contribution to the constitutional side of the debate is considered generous (i.e. 
towards the CJEU).168 This potentially useful tool could convince Luxembourg (which 
neglected this issue) of the constitutional benefits of reconciliation. For our research, it proves 
that preservation of mutual trust is not per se constitutionally beneficial. 
From a human rights perspective, mutual trust’s positive effects on individual 
protection must be acknowledged. Shorter administrative and judicial procedures benefit the 
individual.169 Mutual trust removes judicial hurdles Member States face when processing 
asylum seekers. The system ensures speed in application-processing,170 prevents forum 
shopping, and allocates responsibility among Member States.171 However, Luxembourg’s 
suggested mutual trust carve out entails obvious fundamental rights problems. Here we 
present three arguments that require examining for our balancing exercise. First, we open the 
Charter to recall how it was supposed to interact with the Convention: 
 “In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
[Convention], the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the said Convention.”172 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 (22/10/1986) BVerfGE, [1987] 3 CMLR 225. 
 
165 C-45036/98 Bosphorus vs. Ireland ECtHR 30:6:05. 
 
166 Using the co-respondent procedure, but only after our amendments (see: ‘Co-respondent Procedure’). 
 
167 Halberstam, supra n. 11. 
 
168 See: supra n. 31. 
 
169 Established in ‘Protocol No. 16’, applied to Strasbourg’s effectiveness. 
 
170 Vicini, supra n. 161. 
 
171 Ibid. 
 
172 EUChFR, Article 52(3). 
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Clearly Luxembourg’s interpretation is inconsistent with this Article, as the systematic 
deficiencies approach departs from the Convention’s (intended, according to Strasbourg) 
individual approach. As mentioned above, Callewaert noted that due to this provision, 
Luxembourg’s autonomy is limited in interpreting Charter rights.173 So again, constitutionally 
speaking, mutual trust might not deserve the almost absolute status Luxembourg ascribes it. 
 Secondly, it can be argued that mutual trust is only warranted because the possibility 
for individuals to lodge complaints with Strasbourg exists.174 The ECHR provides the 
institutional guarantees that allow the Dublin system to function without detrimentally 
impairing individual protection. If mutual is be preserved, this option disappears, abolishing 
this justification for its application in the first place. Furthermore, the Charter reads: 
 “Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields of 
application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to 
which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including the 
[Convention], and by the Member States' constitutions.”175 
A mutual trust carve out would abolish Member States’ ability to scrutinize compliance: the 
‘M.S.S. option’ disappears. This restricts fundamental rights as recognized by the Convention, 
and is therefore incompatible with Article 53 ECHR, and our proposal. Furthermore, non-EU 
Contracting Parties would probably reject carve outs of this magnitude (and, Strasbourg 
would probably disallow a reservation of such a general nature176). If the idea of accession 
was improving fundamental rights protection, this definitely has an adverse effect. 
 Finally, we argue that although mutual trust is prominent in EU law, specifically in 
AFSJ, it should not outweigh fundamental rights protection.177 The opposite: the TFEU 
specifically envisions “an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
173 Callewaert, supra n. 26. 
 
174 Battjes, H. ‘The Principle of Mutual Trust in European Asylum, Migration, and Criminal law: Reconciling 
Trust and Fundamental Rights’ Meijers Committee, FORUM, Institute for Multicultural affairs. (2011) p. 11. 
 
175 EUChFR, Article 53 (Emphasis added, translated to American English). 
 
176 ECHR, Article 57(1): “Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted […]”. 
177 Peers, supra n. 8. 
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rights.”178 Moreover, Article 2 TEU reads: “[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect 
for human dignity, freedom, […] and respect for human rights”.179 Eeckhout and Peers argue 
this should trump mutual trust as a “specific characteristic of Union law”.180 Although 
particularly relevant here, this argument reflects on all the Opinions objections, and should 
weigh heavily in our proposal. 
Let us pause here. In the preceding paragraphs, we focused on asylum law (CEAS),181 
and neglected the European Arrest Warrant (FDEAW).182 But a recent decision in the 
FDEAW establishes an interesting shift in Luxembourg’s mutual trust approach, which offers 
an opportunity for reconciliation in our proposal. In Aranyosi,183 an EAW was issued for the 
Hungarian Pál Aranyosi’s surrender to Hungary.184 Upon referral, Luxembourg departed from 
its narrow mutual trust approach, and constructed a ‘two-stage test’:185,186  
The judicial authority executing the EAW surrender must assess: 
1) The general detention circumstances of the issuing Member State, and establish if 
there is a substantial risk of violation of Article 4 EUChFR.187 
2) Whether or not the individual in question runs a real risk of an Article 4 violation.188 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 TFEU, Article 67(1). 
 
179 TEU, Article 2. 
 
180 Eeckhout, supra n. 24., Peers, supra n. 8. 
 
181 Including, but not limited to the Dublin Regulation, and the Reception Conditions Directive 
(https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en). 
 
182 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L190/1 (FDEAW) [6]. 
 
183 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru EU:C:2016:198, par. 29. 
 
184 Following Aranyosi’s arrest in Bremen, Bremen’s Generalstaatsanwaltschaft requested Miskolc’s Miskolci 
járásbíróság to clarify in which facility Aranyosi would be detained, to which Miskolc responded that 
Hungarian authorities have the competence to decide on means of sanctioning. The Generalstaatsanwaltschaft 
generally accepted this – but Bremen’s Hanseatische Oberlandsgericht held surrender would expose Aranyosi to 
conditions violating his fundamental rights.  
 
185 Bovend’Eerdt, K. ‘The Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: A New Limit to the Mutual Trust Presumption 
in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice?’ Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 32(83)(2016) 
p.112-121. 
 
186 This ‘test’ can be distilled from Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, supra n. 183, par. 88-94. 
 
187 Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
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Aranyosi has been interpreted to mean two things: 1) FDEAW mutual trust is not 
unconditional, and 2) a new level of convergence between Strasbourg and Luxembourg case 
law exists.189 Notice its comparability to asylum law’s general versus individual approach. 
Since the Opinion, Luxembourg revisited its strict constitutional mutual trust approach, at 
least concerning FDEAW, and is edging towards Strasbourg’s individualized approach. Here 
lies an opportunity for reconciliation in our research.  
We return to our legal tools to construct a proposal. Although Treaty amendment 
could clarify the workings of mutual trust, Member States would be required to touch upon 
this sensitive issue in the Treaties. Legally it must be considered an option. But it remains the 
question if, even after ratification, this would solve our problem. And, amendment of this 
principle for purposes of accession would to the CJEU (and the Member States) seem to 
conflict with Declaration (No 2) on Article 6(2),190 and Protocol (No 8).191,192 Unilateral 
measures might not appease either Court, and therefore be unfit to our research. Reservations 
on mutual trust under Article 57(2) ECHR would probably be too general for the ECtHR, and 
could detrimentally affect individual protection.  
Hence, we propose a DAA provision adopting the FDEAW Aranyosi ‘two-stage test’ 
to apply in CEAS as well. This would follow, preserve, and respect Luxembourg’s own 
mutual trust interpretation. As it comes closer Strasbourg’s interpretation, it could appease the 
ECtHR. Once the ‘two-stage test’ is applied correctly, fundamental rights protection should 
remain adequate. Halberstam’s Bosphorus-Solange conflict would be resolved, as the EU 
could be party to mutual trust cases in Strasbourg. Furthermore, by narrowing the 
interpretation-gap, it would remedy tension surrounding Articles 52(3) and 53 EUChFR. 
Finally, by respecting fundamental rights, Article 67(1) TFEU, and Article 2 TEU regain their 
significance as specific characteristics of Union law. This would require flexibility from 
Luxembourg’s side. But in light of Aranyosi, this might be presumed reasonable. In any case, 
there appears to be a way forward respecting both constitutional demands and a human rights 
perspective – so our hypothesis is confirmed. We propose: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Both requirements have to be met for EAW-deferral.  
 
189 Bovend’Eerdt, supra n. 185. 
 
190 Preserving “specific features of Union law”, Declaration (No 2) on Article 6(2) TEU. 
 
191 “[P]reserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law”, Protocol (No 8). 
 
192 Making it less politically feasible. 
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Article 8 DAA – Application of the principle of mutual trust 
“In cases concerning a violation of fundamental rights related to the principle of 
mutual trust between the EU Member States, in the area of freedom, security, and 
justice, the application of said principle is only permissible under the following 
conditions: 
i) The general circumstances of the EU Member State in question do not 
resemble a real risk of violation of Article 4 of the Charter; 
ii) The individual in question does not run a real risk of violation of Article 4 of 
the Charter.”  
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The Co-Respondent Mechanism 
 The intricate EU division of powers required193 negotiators to propose a co-respondent 
mechanism that guarantees the correct respondent (i.e. the EU, and/or its Member State[s]) is 
addressed in Strasbourg. Recall the question: ‘if a Member State when implementing an EU 
directive infringes (individual) fundamental rights, is the infringement a product of the 
directive, or of the way the Member State implements it?’ The co-respondent mechanism 
allows Contracting Parties to become party to proceedings in Strasbourg either by a request to 
the ECtHR, or by invitation from it. In both situations Strasbourg decides upon plausibility,194 
i.e. whether conditions to become a co-respondent are met. Although the mechanism could 
solve some of the above-mentioned complexities, the CJEU and the Advocate-General found 
certain aspects inadequate in their “preservation of specific characteristics of EU law.”195 
The Court’s constitutional objections run threefold. First, it found that the plausibility 
check requires the ECtHR to “assess the rules of EU law governing the division of powers 
between the EU and its Member States”,196 which would be “liable to interfere with [it].”197 
Secondly, Luxembourg found no provision excluding the possibility of a co-respondent 
intervening, even if “that Member State may have made a reservation”198 resulting in a 
Protocol (No 8) violation.199 Thirdly, the Court objects that Strasbourg, under the DAA, could 
decide as an exception to the rule of joint responsibility, that only one respondent will be held 
accountable for a violation: “the question of the apportionment of responsibility must be 
resolved solely in accordance with the relevant rules of EU law, and be subject to review, if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Protocol (No 8), Article 1(b). 
 
194 DAA, Article 3(5): “When inviting a High Contracting Party to become co-respondent, and when deciding 
upon a request to that effect, the Court shall seek the views of all parties to the proceedings. When deciding upon 
such a request, the Court shall assess whether, in the light of the reasons given by the High Contracting Party 
concerned, it is plausible that the conditions in paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 of this article are met.” (Emphasis 
added). 
 
195 Opinion 2/13, par. 215-235, View of Advocate-General Kokott in Opinion 2/13. 
 
196 Opinion 2/13, par. 223-224. 
 
197 Ibid., par. 225. 
 
198 Ibid., par. 227. 
 
199 “[The Agreement] shall ensure that nothing therein affects the situation of Member States in relation to the 
[…] Convention, in particular in relation to […] reservations […]”, Protocol (No 8), Article 2. 
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necessary, by the [CJEU], which has exclusive jurisdiction […].”200 Allowing Strasbourg to 
review this is supposedly “tantamount to allowing it to take the place of the [CJEU] in order 
to settle a question that falls within [its] exclusive jurisdiction.”201 The following sections 
assess these arguments, and propose balanced solutions. 
Plausibility check (Article 3(5) DAA) 
The Draft Explanatory Report202 explains the intent of the plausibility check:  
“In the event of a request to join the proceedings as a co-respondent made by a High 
Contracting Party, the Court will decide, having considered the reasons stated in its 
request as well as any submissions by the applicant and the respondent, whether to 
admit the co-respondent to the proceedings […]. [T]he Court will limit itself to 
assessing whether the reasons stated by the High Contracting Party […] are plausible 
in the light of the criteria set out in Article 3, paragraphs 2 or 3, as appropriate, without 
prejudice to its assessment of the merits of the case.”203 
Additionally, Articles 3(1) and 3(2) DAA stipulate that assessment should be made 
based on the reasoning of the requesting party, and not on EU law.204 The drafters probably 
expected these safeguards to satisfy Luxembourg. Luxembourg, however, saw a problematic 
impingement on its jurisdiction as constitutional Court in determining the EU division of 
competences:205 Strasbourg would have to “assess the rules of EU law governing the division 
of powers”,206 which it deemed unacceptable. Advocate-General Kokott sympathizes with this 
conclusion, and opts for a system similar to the EU’s own rules of procedure, which grants 
Member States the right to intervene in all pending actions, unconditionally.207 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Opinion 2/13, par. 234. 
 
201 Ibid. 
 
202 Council of Europe, Final report to the CDDH, Strasbourg, June 10th, 2013, 47+1(2013)008rev2, Appendix V, 
(hereafter: DER), at 55 (Emphasis added). 
 
203 Ibid. 
 
204 DAA, Articles 3(1) and 3(2), in, Storgaard, supra n. 28. 
 
205 Opinion 2/13, par. 223-224. 
 
206 Ibid. 
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Although there are notable differences between the two forums,208 the solution seems 
feasible. From a human rights perspective, the possibility of intervening as co-respondent is a 
positive development. Recall, one of the purposes of accession is to ensure the EU can be held 
responsible for violations. Increasing access to proceedings inherently increases the 
possibility of addressing the correct respondent, and serving justice appropriately. But only, as 
discussed below, if the (co-)respondent cannot avoid responsibility through the addition of a 
co-respondent.209 This adversely affects individual protection, which is unacceptable to our 
balanced equation. 
This problem requires no Treaty amendment, and unilateral declarations would not 
bind Strasbourg to accept a co-respondent. The only way to appease the CJEU (and confirm 
our hypothesis) is DAA amendment. As determined, accepting the CJEU’s (and AG’s) 
demands to remove the plausibility check would not compromise human rights standards, 
given the right conditions.210 We propose these amendments: 
Article 3(1) DAA 
“b. a new paragraph 4 shall be added at the end of Article 36 of the Convention, which 
shall read as follows:  
“4. The European Union or a member State of the European Union may 
become a co-respondent to proceedings in the circumstances set out in the 
Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a 
party to the case.”” 
Article 3(5) DAA 
“A High Contracting Party shall become a co-respondent either by accepting an 
invitation from the Court or upon the request of that High Contracting Party. When 
inviting a High Contracting Party to become co-respondent, the Court shall seek the 
views of all parties to the proceedings.” 
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Reservations 
The CJEU found no safeguards against the possibility of a co-respondent with a 
reservation intervening, resulting in a Protocol (No 8) violation.211 Indeed, this situation is 
technically possible in DAA. Again, we see Luxembourg’s institutionalist tendencies in the 
strict procedural interpretation it applies to dismiss the DAA. For perspective, consider the 
number of reservations made by Member States. Currently, 33 Articles have been reserved 
upon by Member States – 1.18 per Member State. Post-Brexit, 28 Articles would remain – 
1.04 per Member State on average.212 Furthermore, these reservations are of limited 
importance.213 For the purposes of our research however, we must take the Courts argument 
into account, lest we disregard its constitutional demands. 
From a human rights perspective, the effect of this situation on individual fundamental 
rights protection is not evident. Contracting Parties cannot be held accountable for violations 
of Articles reserved upon, regardless of accession. The only discernable difference is the 
possibility to become party to proceedings concerning such Articles, without the possibility to 
be held accountable (under Convention law). It is even arguable this would constitute a 
change in the “situation of Member States in relation to the [Convention]”214 at all. 
So for the purpose of this research, if Luxembourg needs a verification that Strasbourg 
will not hold Contracting Parties accountable for violations of Articles reserved upon, we 
could easily include a clarifying provision in the DAA. No need for Treaty amendment, no 
use for unilateral declarations.215 We propose: 
Article 3(8) DAA 
“The Court will not hold EU Member States responsible for violations of Articles or 
Protocols upon which they have made a reservation, including situations where EU 
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213 De Witte, supra n. 30, p. 697. 
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Member States act as a co-respondent as stipulated in Article 3 of the Agreement on 
the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.” 
Allocation of responsibility (Article 3(7) DAA) 
From a constitutional perspective, the Court’s objections to Strasbourg allocating 
responsibility are understandable. The argument goes that this would require the ECtHR to 
establish an interpretation of the EU division of powers. Note, however, this clause was added 
upon request of EU Member States.216 But it is prima facie fair to assume Strasbourg might 
have to impinge on Luxembourg’s exclusive jurisdiction. So for our research question it is 
essential that allocation of responsibility happens at least without binding interpretations on 
the EU division of power.217 
However, from a human rights perspective, this is tricky. As Lock theorized: once an 
applicant brings a case to a respondent, and a third party joins as a co-respondent which then 
takes full responsibility for the violation, the applicant is deprived of its original 
respondent.218 No Contracting Party should be able to escape responsibility without the 
applicant’s approval. Eeckhout sympathizes, and sees a “high risk that any arrangements 
which comply with [these] conditions will affect the position of victims of human rights 
violations”.219 Most critics applying a human rights perspective agree it is inherently 
necessary for Strasbourg to look into EU law at least minimally, to properly exercise its 
function.220 The question central to our balancing exercise is however, whether Strasbourg 
actually has to look into the EU division of power to allocate responsibility. Arguably, this is 
not the case:221 Strasbourg would only have to determine whether an EU law provision forced 
a Member State into violating the Convention. In this review (part of the core idea of 
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accession) Strasbourg would not have to determine competence, but rather determine on a 
case by case basis the compatibility of a provision of EU law with Convention rights, and 
establish whether it is at the origin of the breach. If it appears incompatible, the EU is 
responsible. If the provision is compatible, the EU is not. 
Constitutionally, the EU division of power is exclusively Luxembourg’s jurisdiction. 
Unilateral declarations would in this case not bind the ECtHR, and probably not satisfy the 
CJEU. Treaty amendment would not fix this issue. But Strasbourg could allocate 
responsibility without touching upon competences, and at least be expected to recognize its 
jurisdictional limits. Therefore, an explanatory provision which clarifies that the EU’s 
division of power is outside Strasbourg’s jurisdiction might suffice to resolve this matter, 
without detrimentally impairing Strasbourg’s capacity in allocating responsibility. Obviously, 
this would entail Luxembourg partially reversing the Opinion’s reasoning. It might also 
somewhat complicate Strasbourg’s ability to assess responsibility. But the fact that the EU 
can be addressed as a respondent, and held accountable, should be considered a positive 
outcome for fundamental rights protection. Therefore it is an acceptable solution, fit for our 
balanced proposal.  
Article 3(7) DAA 
“7. If the violation in respect of which a High Contracting Party is a co-respondent to the 
proceedings is established, the respondent and the co-respondent shall be jointly 
responsible for that violation, unless the Court, on the basis of the reasons given by the 
respondent and the co-respondent, and having sought the views of the applicant, decides 
that only one of them be held responsible. When applying such an exception to the rule of 
joint responsibility, the Court will respect the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in 
relation to the division of power between the EU and its Member States, and restrict itself 
to matters of compatibility with the Convention of the provision of EU law in question.” 
 The four amendments presented here would confirm our hypothesis on the co-
respondent mechanism: there is indeed a balanced way forward. Only the joint application of 
these amendments work: the plausibility check’s solution relies on the allocation of 
responsibility remaining under Strasbourg’s jurisdiction. In the following section, we return to 
the co-respondent mechanism, for its role in the prior involvement procedure. 
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Prior Involvement Procedure 
Created at Luxembourg’s request,222 the prior involvement procedure proposed in 
Article 3(6) DAA intended to remedy the situation where a Member State’s national court 
refers a question concerning acts or omissions of EU Member States to Strasbourg – thus 
bypassing Luxembourg on possible questions of EU law. Although this situation would arise 
“rarely”,223 it is necessary for Luxembourg to assess the Convention-compatibility of EU law 
before Strasbourg pronounces itself on the merits of a case. This much seems uncontested.224 
However, Luxembourg saw two problems with the procedure. First, the ECtHR would have to 
‘accept’ an application for prior involvement from the EU. Luxembourg holds that, 
constitutionally, the decision “whether the [CJEU] has already given a ruling on the same 
question of law as that at issue in the proceedings before the ECtHR [can] be resolved only by 
the competent EU institution, whose decision should bind the ECtHR.”225 It added that the EU 
should be “fully and systematically informed”226 of any case pending before the ECtHR, to 
ensure the “competent EU institution is able to assess”227 the necessity for prior involvement. 
Secondly, Luxembourg found issue with the scope of CJEU review under the procedure. The 
DAA supposedly allows for prior assessment on the interpretation of primary law, and the 
validity of secondary law. But Luxembourg demands the ability to interpret secondary law as 
well.228 The following sections deal with these issues individually. 
Initiation of the procedure 
 From a constitutional perspective, Luxembourg’s demand for EU responsibility in 
determining whether the question at hand has been ruled on, is not surprising. Note the 
specific wording in Article 3(6) DAA only ensures “sufficient time […] for the [CJEU] to 
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make such an assessment, and thereafter for the parties to make observations to the Court.”229 
The CJEU is merely concerned that the possibility of rejection of prior involvement is not 
excluded.230 This is where Halberstam observes a difference in tone: the much-lauded View 
of the Advocate-General agrees with the basic findings of the heavily criticized Opinion of 
the Court, but is phrased as “yes, but only if…” instead of “no, unless…”.231 But in detail, 
both parties demand a different remedy: although the Advocate-General only wants the EU to 
be able to state its view, the CJEU wants sole jurisdiction for the EU on this decision. And for 
our research question, convincing the CJEU is our main concern. The secondary demand 
however, is remarkable. Luxembourg wants the EU to be systematically informed of pending 
cases that could require prior involvement. It neglects to notice that co-respondent status is a 
condicio sine qua non for prior involvement.232 Surely we can expect the EU to be aware of 
any pending case to which they are a party. The Advocate-General offers a more reasonable 
demand: Strasbourg must systematically inform Member States if the EU is eligible as co-
respondent, or the EU if a Member State is.233 If Luxembourg would accept this trade-off as 
sufficient to ensure the proper co-respondents are aware, and thus aware of possible, 
additional prior involvement, constitutionally speaking the CJEU’s demands would be met in 
our proposal.  
From a human rights perspective, such a procedural autonomy question prima facie 
hardly affects individual level of protection: the merits of the applicant’s case would, either 
way, be assessed by Strasbourg. But one phrase in Article 3(6) weighs into the equation: “The 
European Union shall ensure that such assessment is made quickly so that the proceedings 
before the Court are not unduly delayed.”234 Delayed proceedings do not equal a detrimental 
reduction in protection per se – but they matter. This must be a condition to any 
recommendation we propose in our balanced equation: a reasonable time-limit for the 
procedure must be kept in. To the secondary demand it can be said that from a human rights 
perspective there are clear merits to ensuring the correct co-respondents are addressed, so if 
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that requirement (derived from Protocol [No 8]) is met by Advocate-General Kokott’s 
proposal, this can be considered a solution fit for our research (and a confirmation of our 
hypothesis). 
Article 3(6) DAA 
“In proceedings to which the European Union is a co-respondent, if the relevant EU 
institution decides that the Court of Justice of the European Union has not yet assessed 
the compatibility with the rights at issue defined in the Convention or in the protocols 
to which the European Union has acceded of the provision of European Union law as 
under paragraph 2 of this article, this decision shall bind the Court, and sufficient time 
shall be afforded for the Court of Justice of the European Union to make such an 
assessment, and thereafter for the parties to make observations to the Court. The 
European Union shall ensure that such assessment is made quickly so that the 
proceedings before the Court are not unduly delayed. The provisions of this paragraph 
shall not affect the powers of the Court.” 
Article 3(4) DAA 
“Where an application is directed against and notified to both the European Union and 
one or more of its member States, the status of any respondent may be changed to that 
of a co-respondent if the conditions in paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 of this article are 
met. The Court shall fully and systematically inform the EU if it appears eligible as 
co-respondent in a pending case involving an EU member State, and EU member 
States if they appear eligible as co-respondent in a pending case involving the EU, in 
order to ensure proper functioning of the co-respondent procedure, and the prior 
involvement procedure stipulated in Article 3(6) of the Agreement on the Accession of 
the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.” 
Scope of Aricle 3(6) DAA 
The Court’s second argument concerns its scope. The CJEU interpreted paragraph 66 
DER to only allow for assessment of interpretation of primary law, and validity of secondary 
law.235 This was deemed insufficient, and a “breach of the principle that the [CJEU] has 
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exclusive jurisdiction over the definitive interpretation of EU law”.236 Basically, the CJEU 
wants to extend the scope of review. The Advocate-General found the scope sufficiently 
broad,237 but the constitutional demand from the Court is clear: the scope must be clarified 
within the DER to include interpretation of secondary law. 
On this point, no-one is disagreeing with Luxembourg that interpretation of secondary 
EU law should fall within Luxembourg’s scope of review. We can therefore be short in our 
arguments. From a human rights and institutionalist perspective the Court may have applied 
an “overly formalistic approach”238 which conveys a certain lack of trust towards Strasbourg. 
However, this hurdle can be easily overcome without an enormous impact on individual rights 
protection,239 especially considering the situation pre-accession. This would confirm our 
hypothesis. As we have no reason to amend Treaties, or make reservations, we can simply 
amend the relevant DER paragraph: 
Paragraph 66 Draft Explanatory Report  
“… Assessing the compatibility with the Convention shall mean to rule on the 
interpretation of a legal provision contained in acts of the EU institutions, bodies, 
offices or agencies, or on the interpretation of a provision of the TEU, the TFEU or of 
any other provision having the same legal value pursuant to those instruments…”  
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CFSP Jurisdiction 
 The Court’s final argument concerns jurisdiction over the intergovernmental area of 
common foreign and security policy. In CFSP, pursuant Articles 24(1) TEU, 40 TEU, and 275 
TFEU, the CJEU is limited to review of the division of competences between CFSP and other 
areas of EU competence, and review of restrictive measures, respectively.240 Upon accession, 
Strasbourg was envisioned to adjudicate on Convention-compatibility of CFSP measures. The 
CJEU held this creates a gap between Strasbourg’s and Luxembourg’s jurisdictions, liable to 
“entrust the judicial review of those acts, actions, or omissions on the part of the EU 
exclusively to a non-EU body’.241 This problem is of key importance to our research. On the 
one hand, bringing an actor such as CFSP under the Strasbourg-umbrella would be a grand 
achievement for fundamental rights protection, and some might argue the general idea of 
accession. On the other hand, the Court provides us with core constitutional arguments on 
why this cannot be realized in the manner proposed in the DAA.  
 First we must consider this problem from an institutionalist perspective, to provide the 
context of the CFSP-CJEU relationship. The original reason for exempting some areas of 
CSFP from CJEU judicial scrutiny, was to prevent judicial activism in this area, it can be 
safely argued.242 With Opinion 2/13, some see a revitalized attempt of Luxembourg to extend 
its CFSP-jurisdiction through constitutional arguments. Or at least, as Peers claims: “[S]ince it 
isn’t allowed to play, it’s taking the football away from everyone else. It’s the judicial politics 
of the playground.”243 Institutionalism also offers a lens through which Member States might 
look at this problem (and our proposed solution). If Member States feel Luxembourg’s 
objections are mostly offered in order to extend its jurisdiction, or limit another international 
Court’s, they may not accept any proposition altering CFSP’s institutional boundaries. Fear of 
judicial activism cannot be ignored in relation to our research. But we must still critically 
discuss this issue, to see where the potential for reconciliation lies.  
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 The CJEU offered its constitutional argument: “the agreement envisaged fails to have 
regard to the specific characteristics of EU law.”244 It refers to Opinion 1/09, where it held 
that review of acts, actions or omissions on the part of the EU cannot be conferred exclusively 
on an international court which is outside the institutional and judicial framework of the 
EU.245 The focus here should be on the phrase “exclusively”. It is undeniably the case that in 
CFSP matters outside CJEU jurisdiction, Member States’ High Courts are conferred 
jurisdiction under Article 19(1) TEU.246 The question from a constitutional perspective, 
however, is if this counts as a sufficient consolidating option within EU law. The CJEU 
neglected to mention Member States’ High Courts’ consolidating function altogether, but we 
cannot ignore this fact. Halberstam offers the following consideration: the fact that Member 
States courts’ competing interests in adjudicating on CFSP matters would perform the 
consolidating function post-accession, over a harmonized, EU level court, is “in serious 
tension with the constitutional idea of the Union.”247 But his argument presumes Strasbourg 
would review CFSP acts not only on compatibility with the ECHR, but also with EU law.248 
However, there is no specific basis in either the Opinion, the DAA, or the Treaties to come to 
this conclusion.249 However, Luxembourg either; a) did not consider the role of Member 
States’ High Courts under Article 19(1) TEU as sufficient consolidation, or b) did not 
consider this role at all. It seems to demand an extension of its own jurisdiction to include 
matters of CFSP on which the ECtHR could potentially come to rule. The options of carve-
outs and reservations of CFSP matters will be considered below,250 but for now, when 
drafting our proposal we must consider: to properly address the CJEU’s constitutional 
demands, some extension of jurisdiction should be applied. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Opinion 2/13, par. 257., Protocol (No 8). 
 
245 Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123, par. 78, 80, 90. 
 
246 Hillon, C. ‘A Powerless Court? The European Court of Justice and the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ 
The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law, Hart (2014), in Lock (Supra n. 37). Apart from this 
view being shared by Regelsberger, E., and Kugelmann, D., as noted by Lock, it is shared by Eekchout, P., 
Halberstam, D., and Advocate-General Kokott in her View. 
 
247 Halberstam, supra n. 11 p. 37. 
 
248 It is beyond our scope to explain Halberstam’s reasoning here, see: Halberstam, supra n.11, p. 37. 
 
249 Halberstam notes that this assessment indeed is based on a ‘good deal of (contestable) predictions about 
judicial behavior.’, supra n. 11, p. 40. 
 
250 Note the inherent problems with reservations here, for the purposes of human rights protection, and the 
ECtHR. 
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 Indeed, ECtHR external review in general can be considered accession’s core idea. 
And, as mentioned before, to bring CFSP under the Convention-umbrella would be a triumph 
for human rights protection in Europe. It is undeniably preferable that where the CJEU has no 
jurisdiction over certain acts “concerning all questions relating to the Union’s security, 
including the […] common defense policy that might lead to a common defense”251 some 
other form of human rights adjudication is present. Currently, violations committed under 
CFSP can come before Strasbourg only for the Member State’s act, and not for the EU’s 
part.252 Accession was meant to remedy this. From a human rights perspective, therefore, a 
carve-out or reservation of CFSP matters is an unacceptable proposal. This would remove the 
potential benefit of accession in the first place. Furthermore, from a constitutional perspective, 
this would prove difficult. A reservation on CFSP would remain under ECtHR scrutiny; it 
would still have to assess whether or not to adjudicate. Luxembourg would undeniably 
consider this a review of the EU’s division of power. So reservations would be undesirable 
from a human rights perspective, and probably unworkable from a constitutional perspective.  
The throughout this research much-favored option of DAA renegotiation becomes 
difficult to consider as well. An amendment would have to follow one of two lines of 
argument. Either, the DAA would specify that in certain cases of limited CJEU jurisdiction in 
CFSP, the ECtHR also cannot adjudicate. This effect is similar to a reservation, and equally 
complicated. Or, we could grant the CJEU jurisdiction in CFSP to perform the consolidating 
function it requires in the DAA. However, this would be incompatible with Article 6(2) TEU 
and Protocol (No 8).253 
Exhausting other legal options, it is time to consider Treaty revision. Recall, we 
consider this a ‘drastic’ measure. This ties in with the above-mentioned institutionalist 
arguments considering fear of judicial activism. To amend the Treaties involves considering 
the ramifications of the ordinary revision procedure, requiring all Member States’ signatures. 
As established, Member States are probably not willing to considerately expand CJEU 
jurisdiction in CFSP. So before proposing drastic treaty amendments, we must consider what 
the CJEU demands to begin with. 
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252 The implications of which were previously discussed. 
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As the Court’s argument concerning the ‘exclusive’ conferral of jurisdiction to 
Strasbourg omitted consideration Member States’ High Courts’ consolidating function, we 
might consider this function, to some extent, provided for by the Treaties (i.e. conferred to the 
Member States).254 Luxembourg’s remaining concern would be the possibility of Strasbourg 
ruling on fundamental EU law matters outside Luxembourg’s jurisdiction, and outside the 
Convention-compatibility review. Here we should look for reconciliation. If we would extend 
the CJEU’s jurisdiction in CFSP to include an assessment of whether cases before Strasbourg 
involve matters purely of EU law, the CJEU might be appeased. This is no full extension of 
the CJEU’s jurisdiction to all matters of CFSP that can be reviewed by the ECtHR, but an 
explicit and well-defined permission for Luxembourg to assess whether Strasbourg is 
operating outside its Convention-jurisdiction. Realistically speaking, this would rarely be the 
case. The gap in jurisdiction is small to begin with, and we can trust Strasbourg to be capable 
of respecting its jurisdictional boundaries. But in rare instances, Luxembourg would upon our 
proposed amendment be able to intervene. It would be similar to the role it already assumes in 
CFSP: the policing of boundaries of EU competences under Article 40 TEU. The CJEU 
would be systematically informed by the ECtHR on cases concerning CFSP measures (similar 
to our proposal for the co-respondent mechanism). This limited amendment – as opposed to a 
sweeping extension of jurisdiction – could be acceptable to Member States. Constitutionally 
speaking, it allows for extended CJEU jurisdiction. But foremost, it would allow ECtHR 
review of Convention-compatibility of CFSP acts, which is a positive outcome for 
fundamental rights protection. Granted, this is no easy fix. But, considering our hypothesis, 
we can argue that a balanced way forward is possible. 
Article 24(1) TEU 
“…, and in cases pending before the European Court of Human Rights, upon notification 
of said Court, where the Court of Justice of the European Union has found a breach of the 
scope of review granted to the European Court of Human Rights by the Agreement on the 
Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.”255 
Article 10 DAA – Jurisdiction in the area of common foreign and security policy 
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255 At the end of the Article.  
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1. “The Court will, in cases of limited jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the area 
of common foreign and security policy, strictly adhere to review of compatibility 
with the Convention of measures within that area. 
2. The Court shall fully and systematically inform the Court of Justice of pending 
cases concerning the review of compatibility with the Convention of measures in 
the area of common foreign and security policy. The Court of Justice shall make 
an assessment of this review. 
3. If the Court of Justice finds a breach of jurisdiction, this decision shall be binding 
to the Court.” 
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Conclusion 
The way forward in accession to the ECHR is no easy task. After our analyses, we 
have advised thirteen amendments in total: eleven to the DAA; one to the DER; and one to the 
TEU.256 This shows there is a way forward that maintains the level of fundamental rights 
protection in Europe. Throughout this research, our arguments took full account of the present 
legal framework. The proposal ensures “accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as 
defined in the Treaties.”257 Granted, we do advise Treaty amendment to ensure this. 
“Provision[s] for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law” are made, 
and Article 344 is respected. The “specific features of Union law”258 are preserved, and 
relevant case law provided reasonable solutions.  
Our theoretical approach has proven useful: consideration of Luxembourg’s 
constitutional demands and application of a human rights perspective has led us to a sound 
proposal.259 And through examination of the institutionalist perspective, there appears to be 
more to Opinion 2/13 than plain institutionalist tendencies. In some cases, we see theoretical 
overlap: constitutional arguments can often be interpreted as institutionalist tendencies, and 
some constitutional arguments share an end-goal with a human rights perspective. Finding a 
way forward is no novel achievement – but doing so within limits of fundamental rights 
protection and constitutionalism as presented here is a perspective new to the debate. 
We must address our proposal’s feasibility. Considering the largest part of our 
proposals are DAA amendments (‘a cumbersome process’) we recognize the complexities at 
hand. Particularly regarding our TEU-amendment, the proposals would be challenging. 
However, considering the behemoth task of accession, and Luxembourg’s complicated 
demands, any outcome would be ‘challenging’. We have, however, constructed a proposal 
situated on the intersect of our theories, and consider our hypothesis confirmed: there is a way 
forward that respects both constitutional demands and a human rights perspective. 
Considering all the Opinion’s arguments, we conclude that Article 6(2) TEU is no absolute 
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257 TEU, Article 6(2). 
 
258 TEU, Declaration (No 2) on Article 6(2). 
 
259 Supra n. 256. 
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obligation to accede. We therefore hope, in the future, it is also considered conditional to 
Article 67(1) TFEU,260 and Article 2 TEU.261 
The strict theoretical scope of this research has unfortunately somewhat limited our 
perspective. For example, in some sections, the political ‘will’ of certain actors has not been 
fully taken into account. Taken further, one might assess this research to be performed in a 
vacuum, almost void of (relevant) events such as Brexit. Therefore, future research might 
assess accession on stricter terms of feasibility in the political landscape. Furthermore, our 
‘systematic information’-proposals implicitly create new networks of judicial dialogue, with 
possible additional costs. Future research might include an economic perspective, to uncover 
accession’s implicit costs under Luxembourg’s conditions. 
Considering accession’s positive effects, we recommend negotiators to keep moving 
forward. Today’s climate of immigration, cooperation in international arrest warrants and 
extradition, and EU-coordinated troops, calls for an externally accountable EU – and a holistic 
approach to fundamental rights protection in Europe. 
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261 “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, […] and respect for human 
rights.” 
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Appendix I 
Proposed Amendments to the Draft Accession Agreement1 
 
 
Appendix I 
 
Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
 
Preamble  
 
The High Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ETS No. 5), signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (hereinafter 
referred to as “the Convention”), being member States of the Council of Europe, and the 
European Union, 
  
Having regard to Article 59, paragraph 2, of the Convention;  
 
Considering that the European Union is founded on the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms;  
 
Considering that the accession of the European Union to the Convention will enhance 
coherence in human rights protection in Europe;  
 
Considering, in particular, that any person, non-governmental organisation or group of 
individuals should have the right to submit the acts, measures or omissions of the European 
Union to the external control of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to 
as “the Court”);  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Proposed amendments are italicized, and red. If text is removed, it is stricken through.  
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Considering that, having regard to the specific legal order of the European Union, which is 
not a State, its accession requires certain adjustments to the Convention system to be made by 
common agreement,  
 
Have agreed as follows:  
 
Article 1 – Scope of the accession and amendments to Article 59 of the Convention  
 
1. The European Union hereby accedes to the Convention, to the Protocol to the Convention 
and to Protocol No. 6 to the Convention.  
 
2. Article 59, paragraph 2, of the Convention shall be amended to read as follows:  
 
“2.a. The European Union may accede to this Convention and the protocols thereto. 
Accession of the European Union to the protocols shall be governed, mutatis mutandis, 
by Article 6 of the Protocol, Article 7 of Protocol No. 4, Articles 7 to 9 of Protocol No. 
6, Articles 8 to 10 of Protocol No. 7, Articles 4 to 6 of Protocol No. 12 and Articles 6 
to 8 of Protocol No. 13.  
 
b. The Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms constitutes an integral part of 
this Convention.”  
 
3. Accession to the Convention and the protocols thereto shall impose on the European Union 
obligations with regard only to acts, measures or omissions of its institutions, bodies, offices 
or agencies, or of persons acting on their behalf. Nothing in the Convention or the protocols 
thereto shall require the European Union to perform an act or adopt a measure for which it has 
no competence under European Union law. 
  
4. For the purposes of the Convention, of the protocols thereto and of this Agreement, an act, 
measure or omission of organs of a member State of the European Union or of persons acting 
on its behalf shall be attributed to that State, even if such act, measure or omission occurs 
when the State implements the law of the European Union, including decisions taken under 
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the Treaty on European Union and under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. This shall not preclude the European Union from being responsible as a co-respondent 
for a violation resulting from such an act, measure or omission, in accordance with Article 36, 
paragraph 4, of the Convention and Article 3 of this Agreement.  
 
5. Where any of the terms:  
 
- “State”, “States”, or “States Parties” appear in Article 10 (paragraph 1) and 17 of the 
Convention, as well as in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol, in Article 6 of Protocol No. 
6, in Articles 3, 4 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 5 and 7 of Protocol No. 7, in Article 3 of 
Protocol No. 12 and in Article 5 of Protocol No. 13, they shall be understood as 
referring also to the European Union as a non-state Party to the Convention;  
 
- “national law”, “administration of the State”, “national laws”, “national authority”, 
or “domestic” appear in Articles 7 (paragraph 1), 11 (paragraph 2), 12, 13 and 35 
(paragraph 1) of the Convention, they shall be understood as relating also, mutatis 
mutandis, to the internal legal order of the European Union as a non-state Party to the 
Convention and to its institutions, bodies, offices or agencies;  
 
- “national security”, “economic well-being of the country”, “territorial integrity”, or 
“life of the nation” appear in Articles 6 (paragraph 1), 8 (paragraph 2), 10 (paragraph 
2), 11 (paragraph 2), and 15 (paragraph 1) of the Convention, as well as in Article 2 
(paragraph 3) of Protocol No. 4 and in Article 1 (paragraph 2) of Protocol No. 7, they 
shall be considered, in proceedings brought against the European Union or to which 
the European Union is a co-respondent, with regard to situations relating to the 
member States of the European Union, as the case may be, individually or collectively.  
 
6. Insofar as the expression “everyone within their jurisdiction” appearing in Article 1 of the 
Convention refers to persons within the territory of a High Contracting Party, it shall be 
understood, with regard to the European Union, as referring to persons within the territories of 
the member States of the European Union to which the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union apply. Insofar as this expression refers to 
persons outside the territory of a High Contracting Party, it shall be understood, with regard to 
the European Union, as referring to persons who, if the alleged violation in question had been 
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attributable to a High Contracting Party which is a State, would have been within the 
jurisdiction of that High Contracting Party.  
 
7. With regard to the European Union, the term “country” appearing in Article 5 (paragraph 1) 
of the Convention and in Article 2 (paragraph 2) of Protocol No. 4 and the term “territory of a 
State” appearing in Article 2 (paragraph 1) of Protocol No. 4 and in Article 1 (paragraph 1) of 
Protocol No. 7 shall mean each of the territories of the member States of the European Union 
to which the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union apply.  
 
8. Article 59, paragraph 5, of the Convention shall be amended to read as follows:  
“5. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify all the Council of Europe 
member States and the European Union of the entry into force of the Convention, the names 
of the High Contracting Parties who have ratified it or acceded to it, and the deposit of all 
instruments of ratification or accession which may be effected subsequently.”  
 
Article 2 – Reservations to the Convention and its protocols  
 
1. The European Union may, when signing or expressing its consent to be bound by the 
provisions of this Agreement in accordance with Article 10, make reservations to the 
Convention and to the Protocol in accordance with Article 57 of the Convention.  
 
2. Article 57, paragraph 1, of the Convention shall be amended to read as follows:  
 
“1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of 
ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the 
Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity 
with the provision. The European Union may, when acceding to this Convention, 
make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the 
extent that any law of the European Union then in force is not in conformity with the 
provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this Article.”  
 
Article 3 – Co-respondent mechanism  
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1. Article 36 of the Convention shall be amended as follows:  
 
a. the heading of Article 36 of the Convention shall be amended to read as follows: 
“Third party intervention and co-respondent”;  
 
b. a new paragraph 4 shall be added at the end of Article 36 of the Convention, which 
shall read as follows:  
 
“4. The European Union or a member State of the European Union may 
become a co-respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the 
circumstances set out in the Agreement on the Accession of the European 
Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case. The admissibility of an 
application shall be assessed without regard to the participation of a co-
respondent in the proceedings.”  
 
2. Where an application is directed against one or more member States of the European Union, 
the European Union may become a co-respondent to the proceedings in respect of an alleged 
violation notified by the Court if it appears that such allegation calls into question the 
compatibility with the rights at issue defined in the Convention or in the protocols to which 
the European Union has acceded of a provision of European Union law, including decisions 
taken under the Treaty on European Union and under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, notably where that violation could have been avoided only by disregarding 
an obligation under European Union law.  
 
3. Where an application is directed against the European Union, the European Union member 
States may become co-respondents to the proceedings in respect of an alleged violation 
notified by the Court if it appears that such allegation calls into question the compatibility 
with the rights at issue defined in the Convention or in the protocols to which the European 
Union has acceded of a provision of the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union or any other provision having the same legal value 
pursuant to those instruments, notably where that violation could have been avoided only by 
disregarding an obligation under those instruments.  
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4. Where an application is directed against and notified to both the European Union and one 
or more of its member States, the status of any respondent may be changed to that of a co-
respondent if the conditions in paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 of this article are met. The Court 
shall fully and systematically inform the EU if it appears eligible as co-respondent in a pending 
case involving an EU member State, and EU member States if they appear eligible as co-
respondent in a pending case involving the EU, in order to ensure proper functioning of the co-
respondent procedure, and the prior involvement procedure stipulated in Article 3(6) of the 
Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 
5. A High Contracting Party shall become a co-respondent either by accepting an invitation 
from the Court or by decision of the Court upon the request of that High Contracting Party. 
When inviting a High Contracting Party to become co-respondent, and when deciding upon a 
request to that effect, the Court shall seek the views of all parties to the proceedings. When 
deciding upon such a request, the Court shall assess whether, in the light of the reasons given 
by the High Contracting Party concerned, it is plausible that the conditions in paragraph 2 or 
paragraph 3 of this article are met.  
 
6. In proceedings to which the European Union is a co-respondent, if the relevant EU 
institution decides that the Court of Justice of the European Union has not yet assessed the 
compatibility with the rights at issue defined in the Convention or in the protocols to which 
the European Union has acceded of the provision of European Union law as under paragraph 
2 of this article, this decision shall bind the Court, and sufficient time shall be afforded for the 
Court of Justice of the European Union to make such an assessment, and thereafter for the 
parties to make observations to the Court. The European Union shall ensure that such 
assessment is made quickly so that the proceedings before the Court are not unduly delayed. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not affect the powers of the Court.  
 
7. If the violation in respect of which a High Contracting Party is a co-respondent to the 
proceedings is established, the respondent and the co-respondent shall be jointly responsible 
for that violation, unless the Court, on the basis of the reasons given by the respondent and the 
co-respondent, and having sought the views of the applicant, decides that only one of them be 
held responsible. When applying such an exception to the rule of joint responsibility, the 
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Court will respect the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in relation to the division of power 
between the EU and its Member States, and restrict itself to matters of compatibility with the 
Convention of the provision of EU law in question. 
 
8. The Court will not hold EU Member States responsible for violations of Articles or 
Protocols upon which they have made a reservation, including situations where EU Member 
States act as a co-respondent as stipulated in Article 3 of the Agreement on the Accession of 
the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. 
 
9. This article shall apply to applications submitted from the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement.  
 
Article 4 – Inter-Party cases  
 
1. The first sentence of Article 29, paragraph 2, of the Convention shall be amended to read as 
follows:  
 
 “A Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and merits of inter-Party applications 
submitted under Article 33”.  
 
2. The heading of Article 33 of the Convention shall be amended to read as follows: “Inter-
Party cases”.  
 
3. The Court of Justice, under Article 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, has sole jurisdiction in questions between the EU Member States, or between the EU 
Member States and the European Union, that fall within the scope ratione materiae of EU law. 
 
Article 5 – Protocol No. 16  
 
In the event of a request for an advisory opinion from the Court, in the meaning established in 
Protocol No. 16 of the Convention, EU Member States shall recognize their obligation for 
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice under Article 267 of the Treaty on the 
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Functioning of the European Union, in all questions relating to the interpretation, application, 
and validity of European Union law. 
 
Article 6 – Interpretation of Articles 35 and 55 of the Convention  
 
Proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be understood as 
constituting neither procedures of international investigation or settlement within the meaning 
of Article 35, paragraph 2.b, of the Convention, nor means of dispute settlement within the 
meaning of Article 55 of the Convention.  
 
Article 7 – Interpretation of Articles 53 of the Charter and the Convention 
 
EU Member States, when interpreting Article 53 of the Convention, shall respect the primacy, 
unity, and effectiveness of EU law. In particular, they shall not interpret Article 53 of the 
Convention as an obligation to provide higher domestic standards of fundamental rights 
protection than guaranteed by the Convention. 
 
Article 8 – Application of the principle of mutual trust 
 
In cases concerning a violation of fundamental rights related to the principle of mutual trust 
between the EU Member States, in the area of freedom, security, and justice, the application 
of said principle is only permissible under the following conditions: 
 
i) The general circumstances of the EU Member State in question do not resemble a 
real risk of violation of Article 4 of the Charter; 
 
ii) The individual in question does not run a real risk of violation of Article 4 of the 
Charter. 
 
Article 9 – Election of judges  
 
1. A delegation of the European Parliament shall be entitled to participate, with the right to 
vote, in the sittings of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe whenever the 
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Assembly exercises its functions related to the election of judges in accordance with Article 
22 of the Convention. The delegation of the European Parliament shall have the same number 
of representatives as the delegation of the State which is entitled to the highest number of 
representatives under Article 26 of the Statute of the Council of Europe.  
 
2. The modalities of the participation of representatives of the European Parliament in the 
sittings of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies shall 
be defined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in co-operation with the 
European Parliament.  
 
Article 10– Jurisdiction in the area of common foreign and security policy 
 
1. “The Court will, in cases of limited jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the area of 
common foreign and security policy, strictly adhere to review of compatibility with the 
Convention of measures within that area. 
 
2. The Court shall fully and systematically inform the Court of Justice of pending cases 
concerning the review of compatibility with the Convention of measures in the area of 
common foreign and security policy. The Court of Justice shall make an assessment of this 
review. 
 
3. If the Court of Justice finds a breach of jurisdiction, this decision shall be binding to the 
Court. 
 
Article 11 – Participation of the European Union in the meetings of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe  
 
1. Article 54 of the Convention shall be amended to read as follows:  
 
“Article 54 – Powers of the Committee of Ministers  
1. Protocols to this Convention are adopted by the Committee of Ministers.  
2. Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the powers conferred on the Committee 
of Ministers by the Statute of the Council of Europe.”  
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2. The European Union shall be entitled to participate in the meetings of the Committee of 
Ministers, with the right to vote, when the latter takes decisions under Articles 26 ( paragraph 
2), 39 (paragraph 4), 46 (paragraphs 2 to 5), 47 and 54 (paragraph 1) of the Convention.  
 
3. Before the adoption of any other instrument or text:  
 
– relating to the Convention or to any protocol to the Convention to which the 
European Union is a party and addressed to the Court or to all High Contracting 
Parties to the Convention or to the protocol concerned; 
 
– relating to decisions by the Committee of Ministers under the provisions referred to 
in paragraph 2 of this article; or  
 
– relating to the selection of candidates for election of judges by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe under Article 22 of the Convention,  
 
the European Union shall be consulted within the Committee of Ministers. The latter shall 
take due account of the position expressed by the European Union.  
 
4. The exercise of the right to vote by the European Union and its member States shall not 
prejudice the effective exercise by the Committee of Ministers of its supervisory functions 
under Articles 39 and 46 of the Convention. In particular, the following shall apply:  
 
a. in relation to cases where the Committee of Ministers supervises the fulfilment of 
obligations either by the European Union alone, or by the European Union and one or 
more of its member States jointly, it derives from the European Union treaties that the 
European Union and its member States express positions and vote in a co-ordinated 
manner. The Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution 
of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements shall be adapted to ensure that 
the Committee of Ministers effectively exercises its functions in those circumstances.  
 
b. where the Committee of Ministers otherwise supervises the fulfilment of obligations 
by a High Contracting Party other than the European Union, the member States of the 
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European Union are free under the European Union treaties to express their own 
position and exercise their right to vote.  
 
Article 12 – Participation of the European Union in the expenditure related to the 
Convention  
 
1. The European Union shall pay an annual contribution dedicated to the expenditure related 
to the functioning of the Convention. This annual contribution shall be in addition to 
contributions made by the other High Contracting Parties. Its amount shall be equal to 34% of 
the highest amount contributed in the previous year by any State to the Ordinary Budget of 
the Council of Europe.  
 
2.  a. If the amount dedicated within the Ordinary Budget of the Council of Europe to the 
expenditure related to the functioning of the Convention, expressed as a proportion of 
the Ordinary Budget itself, deviates in each of two consecutive years by more than 2.5 
percentage points from the percentage indicated in paragraph 1, the Council of Europe 
and the European Union shall, by agreement, amend the percentage in paragraph 1 to 
reflect this new proportion. 
  
b. For the purpose of this paragraph, no account shall be taken of a decrease in 
absolute terms of the amount dedicated within the Ordinary Budget of the Council of 
Europe to the expenditure related to the functioning of the Convention as compared to 
the year preceding that in which the  
 
c. The percentage that results from an amendment under paragraph 2.a may itself later 
be amended in accordance with this paragraph.  
 
3. For the purpose of this article, the expression “expenditure related to the functioning of the 
Convention” refers to the total expenditure on:  
 
a. the Court;  
 
b. the supervision of the execution of judgments of the Court; and  
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c. the functioning, when performing functions under the Convention, of the Committee 
of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe,  
 
increased by 15% to reflect related administrative overhead costs.  
 
4. Practical arrangements for the implementation of this article may be determined by 
agreement between the Council of Europe and the European Union.  
 
Article 13 – Relations with other agreements  
 
1. The European Union shall, within the limits of its competences, respect the provisions of:  
 
a. Articles 1 to 6 of the European Agreement relating to Persons Participating in 
Proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights of 5 March 1996 (ETS No. 161);  
 
b. Articles 1 to 19 of the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the 
Council of Europe of 2 September 1949 (ETS No. 2) and Articles 2 to 6 of its Protocol 
of 6 November 1952 (ETS No. 10), in so far as they are relevant to the operation of the 
Convention; and  
 
c. Articles 1 to 6 of the Sixth Protocol to the General Agreement on Privileges and 
Immunities of the Council of Europe of 5 March 1996 (ETS No. 162).  
 
2. For the purpose of the application of the agreements and protocols referred to in paragraph 
1, the Contracting Parties to each of them shall treat the European Union as if it were a 
Contracting Party to that agreement or protocol.  
 
3. The European Union shall be consulted before any agreement or protocol referred to in 
paragraph 1 is amended.  
 
4. With respect to the agreements and protocols referred to in paragraph 1, the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe shall notify the European Union of:  
APPENDIX I – Proposed Amendments to the Draft Accession Agreement 
 
74	  
	  
 
a. any signature;  
 
b. the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession;  
 
c. any date of entry into force in accordance with the relevant provisions of those 
agreements and protocols; and  
 
d. any other act, notification or communication relating to those agreements and 
protocols.  
 
Article 14 – Signature and entry into force  
 
1. The High Contracting Parties to the Convention at the date of the opening for signature of 
this Agreement and the European Union may express their consent to be bound by:  
 
a. signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; or  
 
b. signature with reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval, followed by 
ratification, acceptance or approval.  
 
2. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe.  
 
3. This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration 
of a period of three months after the date on which all High Contracting Parties to the 
Convention mentioned in paragraph 1 and the European Union have expressed their consent 
to be bound by the Agreement in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.  
 
4. The European Union shall become a Party to the Convention, to the Protocol to the 
Convention and to Protocol No. 6 to the Convention at the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement.  
 
Article 15 – Reservations  
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No reservation may be made in respect of the provisions of this Agreement.  
 
Article 16 – Notifications  
 
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify the European Union and the 
member States of the Council of Europe of:  
 
a. any signature without reservation in respect of ratification, acceptance or approval;  
 
b. any signature with reservation in respect of ratification, acceptance or approval;  
 
c. the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval;  
 
d. the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with Article 10;  
 
e. any other act, notification or communication relating to this Agreement.  
 
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed this 
Agreement.  
 
Done at ............. the ............., in English and in French, both texts being equally authentic, in 
a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified copies to each member State of the 
Council of Europe and to the European Union. 
 
